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Law’s Laboratory: Developing International Law 
on Investment Protection as Common Law 
 
By Frédéric G. Sourgens* 
 
Abstract: This Article posits that international law on investment protection develops 
as a common law through adjudication of investor-state disputes.  It reviews the three 
prevalent theories on the development of international law on investment protection.  
These three theories are (a) that investor-state decisions reflect a new customary 
international law, (b) that investor-state decisions are a potentially corrupt tool of 
corporate usurpation of international law, and (c) that investor-state disputes form 
part of a self-contained legal regime.  The Article explains that each theory fails 
because it superimposes policy preferences not present in investor-state decisions.  In 
rejecting these theories, this Article argues that investor-state disputes trace a case-
by-case common law process rather than conform to any rigid theory.  Accordingly, 
this Article provides a cogent theory of persuasive precedent in investor-state 
arbitration premised upon a common law understanding of persuasive authority in 
the U.S. courts.  The case-by-case common law approach clarifies the current 
problem of substantively inconsistent decisions arising out of investor-state disputes.  
Normatively, the decision-making divergence between investor-state tribunals is 
preferable to artificial uniformity that the three currently prevalent theories impose 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Internationalists frequently decry the “Americanization” of 
international law.1  Most similarly disfavor a common law conception of 
international law.2  While champions of a common law approach do exist, 
they leave the reasons for adoption of a common law approach significantly 
under-theorized.3  This Article sets out to correct the near instinctive 
resistance to a common law approach to international law.  In doing so, it 
furnishes a cogent theoretical appraisal of an increasingly important field of 
application of international law—the arbitration of claims by foreign 
investors against their host states under international treaties. 
The unique relevance of the common law approach to contemporary 
international law should be readily apparent.  A web of international courts 
and tribunals currently applies international law to the conduct of states 
towards their own nationals, prosecutes offenders of international crimes, 
regulates international trade, polices the seas, and protects international 
investments.4  The resulting explosion of international law in the form of 
judgments, arbitral awards, and tribunal decisions under crisscrossing 
treaties has given an unprecedented concreteness to international legal 
rights and obligations.  This development evokes parallels to the 
institutional design of the common law.  In both systems, what is 
concretely law (rather than legal principle) is resolved in adjudication of 
(hard) cases rather than through legislative action.5 
The explosion of adjudication predictably threw international law into 
an unprecedented state of disarray.  With the growing number of courts and 
tribunals, “court-splits” on related legal questions before them increased.  
 
1 See Christos Ravanides, The Internationalization of the American Journal of International Law: 
Reality or Chimera? (A Survey), 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 193 (2008); see also MARTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 
522–32 (2d ed. 2005) (criticizing “law-as-fact” approaches associated with the U.S. common law 
approach). 
2 See, e.g., Manley O. Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37 HARV. 
L. REV. 970 (1924); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
33 (1965); see also Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: 
Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 545–46 (2004). 
3 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft Law of 
International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 524–25 (2009) (positing without analysis that “[u]nlike 
common law, however, these rules [adopted by international tribunals] lack the binding force of law”); 
Jeffrey P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a 
Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129 (2007) (providing a purely descriptive study of 
jurisprudence). 
4 See, e.g., Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775 (2012). 
5 For a discussion of the virtues and short-comings of a disputes-based and a legislation-based legal 
system, see, for example, Frederik Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006) 
(warning of the potential shortcomings of a case-by-case approach to rule establishment inherent in 
U.S. common law). 
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Competition between tribunals appears to be on the rise, with some 
scholars considering that certain tribunals use their approach to the law as 
an outright “marketing tool” to become, for certain questions of 
international law, what Delaware has become for corporate law in the 
United States.6  As academia grapples with this phenomenon, responses 
have varied from apology, dystopia, utopia, and back again.  But the 
common theme emerging from almost any study is that the multiplication 
of narrow, concrete rules in disparate specialized dispute resolution bodies 
has created challenging obstacles to any grand theory of international law 
to which each concrete rule could be reduced.  Competition has led to a 
perception of dangerous “fragmentation” of international law into a number 
of international laws, plural, each administered wholly independently by 
one of the various courts and tribunals. 
This fragmentation and the attendant inconsistencies and competition 
between different tribunals do not threaten the coherence and cohesion of 
international law particularly when viewed from a common law 
perspective.  This international law development is much like a domestic 
phenomenon.  Despite the existence of circuit splits and major differences 
in approaches to law there nevertheless exists one common law of 
contracts, torts, property, etc.  In fact, it is these divergences that enliven 
the debate about finding better problem solutions in legal academia and the 
courts.  And it is the cross-fertilization between different branches of the 
law that results in the evolution of the common law to respond to new 
social and economic realities.7 
The problem that emerges thus is one of current theories about 
international investment jurisprudence rather than necessarily a problem of 
the jurisprudence itself.  These theories are that international investment 
jurisprudence evidences customary international law, that international 
investment jurisprudence should not be consulted as a source of law or 
inspiration at all, and that international investment jurisprudence is part of a 
self-contained international legal regime.  All of these theories seek to 
impose a principled uniformity on investor-state arbitration to explain and 
(de)legitimize the near instantaneous growth of a body of decisional law 
under a network of approximately 3,000 international investment 
agreements (IIAs), most of which are bilateral international investment 
agreements (BITs).  This decisional approach leads current theories to fail 
descriptively—each proposed principle cannot be defended in the face of 
 
6 See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1606–12 (2011); 
Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411, 440–
44 (2008).  On the role of the Delaware Chancery as a competitive jurisdiction, see John C. Coffee, Jr., 
The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change, Continuity—And Competition, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
387, 394–404 (2012) (describing the competitive pressure on courts in U.S. corporate litigation). 
7 See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 74 (1988). 
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treaty, state, or arbitral practice.8  But it also fails normatively because it 
cannot support why uniformity along the lines of its chosen principle would 
be desirable despite contrary state and arbitral practice. 
The resulting problem for these theories reflects a well-known aporia 
about general international law posited in critical international legal 
theory.9  Existing theories to international investment arbitration over-
determine and under-determine the law by arguing for a specific result 
from mutually exclusive premises: either the theory posits that its proposal 
is law because it is accepted as such by state parties, or it submits that it is 
legal on account of some higher order normative principle which overrules 
the potential objection of the states against which it is being marshaled.  
Existing theories are caught between “is” and “ought,” giving an 
inadequate account of either. 
This Article argues that this impasse can be overcome by treating 
investor-state arbitration not from the vantage point of an “investment law” 
it supposedly creates but from the point of view of the decisional process of 
resolving investor-state disputes.  This process reveals a remarkably 
different picture from any of the theories espoused so far.  Counsels engage 
the entirety of international and comparative law to frame the international 
legal problem the tribunal must resolve.  This engagement problematizes 
record events as legally relevant facts through the invocation of prior 
decisions dealing with factually analogous questions.  This problem 
conditions the interpretation of legal instruments.  Further, the choice of 
case law by counsel is not limited to any one subset of international law but 
encompasses all of the specialized tribunals.  Rather than seeking to 
segregate investment protection from general international law, the process 
of investor-state arbitration seeks to integrate it within a larger international 
legal framework. 
The appreciation of the process of decision in investor-state arbitration 
evidences that it does not operate deductively as existing theories assert.  
Rather, judicial and arbitral decisions reason inductively from legally 
relevant facts to the applicable legal rules.  To answer the problem of 
earlier theories, the common law approach posits that there is simply no 
organizing principle to defend.  Common law rule establishment occurs in 
the absence of such a principle, premised instead upon the problematization 
of facts through the lens of any prior international legal decisions.  The 
previously challenging concreteness of cases consequently creates 
coherence within the common law by providing pragmatic prototypes for 
problem solution. 
Not only does investor-state adopt the inductive logic of the common 
 
8 See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1059 (2012). 
9 An aporia denotes a perplexing difficulty falling just short of a paradox.  For development of the 
aporia, see, for example, David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 275 
(1985); KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1. 
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law, its use of prior decisions by an international adjudicatory body follows 
the same logic as the use of persuasive precedent in U.S. common law.  It 
treats prior decisions as convincing because of their precision, weight, and 
canonicity.  The dimension of precision, in particular, explains why 
decisions can in fact disagree with lines of cases having apparent superior 
weight. 
The common law approach further corrects the perception that 
jurisprudence is “soft law,” simply on account of being non-binding.10  
Such a claim may be substantively accurate, but it seriously misunderstands 
the importance of jurisprudence to the decision-making process.  Although 
each decision is not binding, it would be impossible for tribunals to 
exercise their function without recourse to jurisprudence.  Jurisprudence 
sets the parameters of relevant record facts (as opposed to irrelevant ones) 
on the basis of which the legal determination of the case must proceed.  By 
permitting the tribunal to set the factual parameters of its inquiry, 
jurisprudence is instrumental to the inductive process of decision-making.  
Jurisprudence is not “soft law” so much as it is a hardwired component of 
legal analysis. 
This Article is structured as follows.  Part II explores existing theories 
of international investment law and their respective shortcomings.  It 
concludes that each of these theories is trapped in a critical knot of 
argument from mutually exclusive premises.  Part III approaches investor-
state arbitration from the point of process.  It concludes that investor-state 
arbitration is both more integrative of general international law solutions by 
borrowing from a wide range of public international law disputes, and more 
record determined by comparing principally the facts of these disputes to 
record facts proved in the arbitration than the prevalent academic views had 
theorized.  Part IV reconstructs a theory of investor-state arbitration on the 
basis of the process insights in Part III.  Part V concludes that a common 
law approach to investor-state arbitration overcomes both the descriptive 
and normative infirmities of existing approaches to investor-state 
arbitration. 
 
II.  LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING THEORIES OF PRECEDENT 
 
Investor-state arbitration is fertile ground for the competing theories 
addressing the new and expanded role of international law.  The extreme 
positions are, on the one hand, the exploding web of IIAs and decisions 
interpreting them to develop new customary international law,11 and, on the 
other hand, the denial that this growth of treaties and decisions could 
 
10 Guzman & Meyer, supra note 3, at 524–26. 
11 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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legitimately expand the scope of international law.12  Between these 
extreme positions, some authors advocate that arbitral decisions generate a 
specialized regime of international investment law in its own right but do 
not have free-standing force of law.13  As discussed in this part, each of 
these theoretical approaches is structurally and normatively problematic: 
they rest on generalizations champions of each theory themselves call into 
question and result in a vision of international law that is either undesirably 
extreme or near irreconcilably fragmented.  Both problems can be 
explained by means of the aporia of the structure of general international 
law proposed by critical international legal theories.14 
As discussed in the next section, the structural and normative 
problems encountered by the currently predominant theories of 
international investment law are not the necessary byproducts of the 
structure of investor-state arbitration itself.15  Rather, these theories are 
descriptively inconsistent with the practice of investor-state arbitration.  It 
is therefore possible to provide a better account of the foundation, structure, 
and development of the role of international law in the resolution of 
investor-state disputes than any of the currently predominant theories 
provide.16 
 
A.  Investor-State Awards as Evincing Customary International Law 
 
Until recently, the most widely accepted theory of international 
investment law was that the explosion of IIAs in their own right created 
customary international law.17  This theory posits that the specific content 
of these customary norms is developed in investor-state arbitrations 
resolving political risk disputes.18  Reliance upon a consistent line of 
investor-state arbitral decisions, therefore, is a means to determine the 
customary international law standard to be applied in any given dispute.19  
 
12 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
13 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
14 See supra note 9. 
15 See discussion infra Part III. 
16 See discussion infra Part IV. 
17 See, e.g., Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary 
International Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 27 (2004).  This theory is distinct from the position, 
subscribed to by other commentators, that some BIT “rights are a confirmation of obligations 
Sovereigns owe under customary international law, others are new.”  Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy 
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent 
Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1532 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis]. 
18 See, e.g., Andreas Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 129 (2003). 
19 This appears to be the rationale for investor-state decisions self-consciously adopting a 
jurisprudence constante approach such as Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, infra note 169.  See Gabriele 
Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse, 23 ARB. INT’L 357, 377 (2007).  
For a full list of relevant decisions, see infra note 169. 
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Conversely, divergence from a line of consistent decisions on a relevant 
point of law is legally fallacious because it is inconsistent with customary 
international law.20  Champions of this theory include Judge Stephen 
Schwebel, a former President of the International Court of Justice;21 
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, a pioneer of the study of international law in 
the world economy;22 Professor José Alvarez, a former President of the 
American Society of International Law;23 and Professor Gabriele 
Kaufmann-Kohler, a leading arbitrator of investor-state disputes.24  As 
discussed in this section, this theory is neither descriptively nor 
normatively defensible because it imposes an inapposite principle of 
property protection over IIAs and the decisions interpreting them. 
 
1.  Rival Conceptions of Customary International Law 
 
The invocation of customary international law must be placed in 
context.  The rapid expansion of international law has led to controversy 
over what customary international law is and how it is proved.  Classically, 
customary international law is defined as “evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law.”25  Its proof required a showing of “widespread and 
representative state practice” and a showing that this state practice arose 
out of sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris.26  But scholars (and courts) 
now disagree about what constitutes “state practice,” and how (or whether) 
to prove the subjective recognition by states of the legal force compelling 
the practice.27 
Classical positivists regard this debate as a dangerous “Trojan horse,” 
undercutting the link between state consent and positive international law 
 
20 See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 377. 
21 See Schwebel, supra note 17; see also Judge Stephan A. Schwebel, 24 LINCOLN’S INN FIELDS, 
http://www.londonarbitrators.net/cvs/sschw.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
22 Compare Lowenfeld, supra note 18, with ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW (2002).  The earlier edition of the similarly entitled book published by Matthew Bender in the 
1980s was hailed as a leader in the field.  See Richard Gardner, Book Reviews and Notes, 76 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 868, 902 (1982) (reviewing PAOLO PICONE & GIORGIO SACERDOTI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 
DELL’ ECONOMIA (1982)). 
23 José E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 32, 57–59 (2009) [hereinafter 
Alvarez, A Bit on Custom]; see also Biography of José E. Alvarez, NYU LAW, https://its.law.nyu.edu/ 
facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?section=bio&personID=30514 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
24 See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19; see also Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard 
2011: The Biggest Cases You Never Heard Of, AM. LAW., July 6, 2011, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/ 
amlawdaily/2011/07/arbscorecard2011.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
25 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter 
ICJ Statute], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0&. 
26 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42–44 (Feb. 20). 
27 See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 
458–59 (2000) (“CIL is an example of nominalization. It survives only because nations and theorists 
mean radically different things when they use the term.”). 
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in the pursuit of a utopian agenda.28  Depending upon the evidence 
available in a given dispute, a custom is established in the absence of clear 
state practice premised exclusively upon the moral force of the rule 
invoked.29  In other cases, customary international law was established 
solely on the basis of state acts.  These state acts have been further diluted 
to permit creation of custom through recent conventional acts of states, i.e., 
the fact of participation in a treaty.30  At times, the same piece of evidence, 
such as conclusion of a multilateral treaty, would be cited as evidence of 
the state practice element or evidence of the opinio juris element.31  In 
short, classical positivists are correct that the proliferation of customary 
international law rules in international awards and judgments facially does 
not meet the traditional elements of customary international law proof. 
The most radical departure from classically positive customary 
international law sought to justify this shift in the context of human rights 
adjudications.32  It argued that these adjudications reflected a form of “new 
custom.”33  This new custom relied heavily upon opinio juris even in the 
absence of consistent state practice.34  It derived this opinio juris from 
 
28 See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law, 92 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44, 44 (1998) (“In his stern critique of ‘relative normativity,’ Prosper Weil 
presented customary law as a type of Trojan horse by which the homogenous normativity of traditional 
international law was threatened.”); see also Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 433–34 (1983); see also Kelly, supra note 27, at 458. 
29 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 97–99 (June 27); Charlesworth, supra note 28, at 45 (“the Nicaragua case, which identified 
customary norms limiting the use of force and intervention despite the lack of supporting state practice, 
has been much criticized”); Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758–59 (2001) [hereinafter Roberts, 
Traditional and Modern Approaches].  But see Herbert W. Briggs, The International Court of Justice 
Lives Up to Its Name, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 78 (1987) (noting that the recognition of the customary rule by 
both parties in pleadings justified the conclusion of opposability of the customary rule to the United 
States). 
30  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 95 
(June 27) (citing approvingly North Sea Continental Shelf); see North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. 
Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
31 Compare Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 98–99 (June 27) (relying upon UN Charter to supply opinio juris), with North Sea Continental 
Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38–39 (Feb. 20) (discussing the possibility of reliance upon a 
multilateral convention in an area in which “State practice [previously] lacked uniformity”); see also 
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 150 (1987) (including the 
evidence of conclusion of the UN Charter for the proposition of non-intervention at issue in the 
Nicaragua case in opinio juris and potentially including conclusion of multilateral treaties addressing 
maritime border issues in state practice). 
32 See, e.g., Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches, supra note 29. 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 
38–39 (1996) (“[L]aw is ‘constitutional,’ in a new sense.  The international system, having identified 
contemporary human values, has adopted and declared them to be fundamental law, international law.  
But, in a radical derogation from the axiom of ‘sovereignty,’ that law is not based on consent: at least, it 
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nearly universal consent of states to treaties, U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions, or common positions in the drafting of a multilateral treaty.35  
This view of custom thus openly rejects the positivists’ conservative 
conception that only longstanding state practice can prove formal 
acceptance of a customary legal rule by the state against which it is 
invoked.36 
The proposition that IIAs and decisions interpreting them constitute 
customary international law depends critically upon the persuasiveness of 
its view of customary international law.  Resolving this problem is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 
2.  The Descriptive Flaw of IIAs as Custom 
 
The customary international law view of IIAs takes the side of new 
custom.  Its champions admit that a subjective sense of legal obligation on 
the part of signatory states to extend the protections contained in these 
instruments cannot be proved.37  As new custom, it operates deductively 
from a strong (moral) principle of protection of property.38  It claims that 
this principle garnered near universal consent through IIAs.39  
Problematically for the champions of IIAs as customary international law, 
there is no such near universal consent.40 
As an initial matter, there is no multilateral consensus on the 
substance of investment protection.41  The failure of several successive 
multilateral treaties weakens the claim that bilateral IIAs evidence near 
 
does not honor or accept dissent, and it binds particular states regardless of their objection.”).  This 
custom resides on the extreme of Kirgis’ sliding scale.  See Kirgis, supra note 31, at 150. 
35 See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, Generally Accepted International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 
(1986); Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J 226, 254 (July 8); see also Pemmaraju 
Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of 
Internationanl Law or its Fragmentation, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 929, 942–43 (2004) (discussing the 
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons decision). 
36 See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 28. 
37 See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 129–30; Kelly, supra note 27, at 460, 469; M. 
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 82–85 (2010); see also Patrick 
Dumberry, Are BITs Representing the “New” Customary International Law in International Investment 
Law?, 28 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 675, 690–93 (2010); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties 
That Hurt Them: The Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 666–67 
(1998) (“LDCs face a prisoner’s dilemma in which it is optimal for them, as a group, to reject the Hull 
Rule, but in which each individual LDC is better off ‘defecting’ from the group by signing a BIT that 
gives it an advantage over other LDCs in the competition to attract foreign investors.”). 
38 See infra note 43.  For the deductive nature of new custom, see Bruno Simma, Book Note, 
Georges Abi-Saab, Cours Général de Droit International Public, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 577, 578 (1998). 
39 See supra notes 34–35. 
40 See infra note 43. 
41 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 81–82, 233. 
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universal support for a strong principle of investment protection.42  
Bilateral IIAs differ significantly both between treaty programs and within 
the same program.43  These differences concern the scope of critical 
investment protections, such as the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
arbitrary treatment, the expropriation standard, and the scope of regulatory 
action that, by agreement of the treaty parties, falls entirely outside the 
scope of these treaties.44  These differences undercut claims that there is 
agreement on a meaningful principle of property protection in IIAs. 
Champions of the customary international law theory cannot 
overcome this problem by arguing that certain provisions in IIAs are 
sufficiently uniform to create custom.45  This position leads to a snippet 
hunt for isolated treaty language without providing a rationale why these 
treaty provisions can be read in isolation.46  Furthermore, even if treaty 
provisions could be isolated, it is far from clear whether the drafting of 
later generation investment treaties did not in fact narrow the range of 
treaty protections by other means such as the inclusion of non-precluded 
measures clauses—a development which an isolated reading would not 
take into account.47  
The claim that IIAs would create new custom is not without irony.  
Champions of IIAs as custom typically deny that UN General Assembly 
resolutions purporting to limit the scope of international law with regard to 
the rights of aliens, especially with regard to natural resource investments, 
 
42 A strong case could be made (and has been made) to the contrary.  See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 8, 
at 1058 (“[T]he fragmented codification of international investment law is a key, and underappreciated, 
reason that states have been unable to agree on a truly multilateral set of investment rules.”). 
43 See id. at 1059–67; SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 81–82, 233; see also Bernard Kishoiyian, 
The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 327 (1994) (insufficient congruence between BITs to create a customary norm); 
Matthew C. Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
79 (2006) (the asserted customary international law minimum standard of treatment is too amorphous to 
constitute a legal rule); Dumberry, supra note 37, at 685–90. 
44 See supra note 43. 
45 See Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 32–33. 
46 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions of 
Professor Brigitte Stern (June 21, 2011). 
47 See, e.g., Kenneth Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model BITs, 
Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, Y.B. INT’L L. & POL’Y 283, 288 (2008) (“The second 
objective was to preserve greater regulatory discretion for the BIT parties.  This was to be achieved by 
increasing the number of general exceptions to BIT obligations, by allowing the parties greater latitude 
to maintain or adopt measures that do not conform to certain BIT obligations.”).  By ignoring the 
exceptions provisions, the customary international law advocates would thus ignore the balance 
intended to be struck for example with regard to the facially broader expropriation provisions.  See also 
Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 223 (2010) (“Scrutiny of the internal practices of the treaty parties or states as 
a whole would demonstrate that these standards are unrealistic and inappropriate for use as the 
threshold for review.”). 
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created custom that relies on the traditional definition of custom.48  Their 
own invocation of the new customary theory in the current, changed 
climate thus seems at best opportunistic and at worst, hypocritical. 
Even admitting that the champions of IIAs as new custom had it right, 
custom would swing between extremes at an alarming rate.  In twenty 
years, new custom would swing from strong investment protection at the 
end of World War II to a significant limitation of investment protection in 
the 1960s and 1970s.49  In another twenty years, it would swing back again 
to strong investment protection through the adoption of IIAs.50  The 
perceived backlash against IIAs could be used by IIA opponents as 
evidence of yet another sea change, swinging the pendulum of new custom 
back to the 1970s.51  The customary international law of investment 
protection would thus change more quickly than the ordinary shelf life of a 
production sharing agreement to which it would apply.52  This consequence 
of adoption of a new custom framework shows that the attempt is 
ultimately impractical. 
 
3.  The Normative Flaw of IIAs as Custom 
 
In the absence of evidence of consistent state practice or opinio juris, 
the customary international law position is reduced to simple policy 
preference.  It prefers universalizing the IIA interpretations of the first 
generation of investor-state arbitrations.53  Because there is no external 
descriptive reason why this line of decisions should be preferred, i.e., state 
practice or opinio juris, the preference must be defended normatively.54  
The normative defense would have to explain why the law would be better 
or bring about better results if it were organized following this first 
generation of decisions.  Such a normative defense is almost entirely absent 
in the literature defending this point of view.  As it stands, the customary 
international law position appears to rest on an arbitrary policy 
preference.55 
 
48 See Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 39. 
49 See supra note 43. 
50 See supra note 43. 
51 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 81–82, 233. 
52 See, e.g., Robert Peachey, Comment, Petroleum Investment Contracts After the Baku-Tblisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 739, 740 (2011) (discussing production sharing 
agreement with 30 year term); Ernest E. Smith, From Concessions to Service Contracts, 27 TULSA L.J. 
493, 516 (1992) (discussing 20 year time frame for production sharing agreements).  Placing the custom 
argument on a “sliding scale” does not assist in the argument as the problems identified concern both 
state practice and opinio juris.  See Kirgis, supra note 31, at 150. 
53 See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 377. 
54 See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
55 See Lowenfeld, supra note 18; Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23; Schwebel¸ supra note 
17; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19. 
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The customary international law thesis also threatens the legitimacy of 
the entire IIA enterprise.  The continued use of IIAs depends upon the faith 
of treaty parties that the bargains reflected in their mutually agreed upon 
treaty language will in fact be enforced.  Champions of the customary 
international law undercut this faith when hunting for snippets of preferred 
treaty provisions across IIAs in order to generate evidence of conforming 
state practice.56  The result of the snippet hunt is a supposed affirmation of 
principles contained in early model U.S. BITs as custom.57  This customary 
international law then feeds back into the interpretation of IIAs that 
precisely negotiated away from the early U.S. BIT positions.58  Customary 
international law, ironically, is used as a bulwark against treaty practice in 
a way that reveals a principled preference for stronger investment 
protection provisions on the part of its champions.59  It appears to be 
precisely the Trojan horse that classical positivists warned the invocation of 
customary international law had become.60 
This does not mean that the customary international law thesis has 
been entirely unsuccessful.  The notion that there is no international legal 
obligation, at all, owed to foreign investors is certainly no longer defensible 
given the current treaty practice.61  Further, the proponents of the 
customary international law thesis recognized a feature of critical 
significance: “[I]n practice, publicly available arbitral decisions, including 
those by investor-state arbitrators, are more than just ‘subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.’”62  They are important “simply because 
such bodies necessarily are required to apply law to concrete facts and 
generally operate within a tradition that discourages findings of ‘non-
liquet.’”63  This insight is critical for understanding to what kind of system 
of international law arbitral decisions contribute.  But its significance, as is 
also discussed below, does not depend upon the inclusion of the rules of 
decisions developed in earlier decisions in customary international law. 
 
 
56 Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 32, 42–43. 
57 See, e.g., Schwebel, supra note 17, at 30. 
58 See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 47, at 288. 
59 See, e.g., Schwebel, supra note 17, at 30 (“All this said, in the last few years elements of opinion 
in the U.S., evidencing an antipathy to foreign investment comparable to that shown at the time of the 
American Revolution, seem intent on crippling a U.S. policy that has endured for more than one 
hundred fifty years.  The new model BIT embodies regressive changes that are deplorable.  They have 
the further deficiency of prejudicing my thesis.”). 
60 See supra note 28. 
61 See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 82–85, 184 (describing the confused state of the law at 
the beginning of the IIA era). 
62 Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 45; Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 129. 
63 Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 46. 
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B.  Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle 
 
At the other extreme, some authors submit that IIAs and arbitral 
decisions interpreting them are odious or unfair.64  These authors therefore 
reject that arbitral decisions should have much of any legal or persuasive 
force.65  They argue that the IIA process has introduced multinational 
corporations as a new, powerful, and unregulated international legal actor.66  
They further assert that arbitral decisions inherently and illegitimately favor 
the corporate interests over the sovereign regulatory prerogative of the host 
state and thereby do serious damage to developing states.67  The leading 
champion of this position is Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah.68  Others 
include Professors Gus Van Harten, David Schneiderman, Peter 
Muchlinski, and, as muse if not participant, Andrew Guzman.69 
 
1.  The Critique of IIAs and Investor-State Arbitration 
 
At its core, the critical movement argues that “the writings of 
publicists and the decisions of tribunals, including arbitral tribunals, are 
eminently manipulable towards the creation of an international law that 
applies to foreign investments.”70  Multinational companies,71 and their 
 
64 See Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime (Sept. 2, 
2010) [hereinafter Van Harten Statement], available at http://alainet.org/active/40578&lang=es. 
65 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37. 
66 Id. at 6, 55, 57, 61.  For a detailed discussion of a corporate regulatory agenda, see PETER T. 
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE & THE LAW 81–122 (2007) (concluding that “there has 
been a transformation in political discourse which challenges not the legitimacy and value of free 
private enterprise as such, but its legitimacy as a polluter, an abuser of market power, a corruptor of 
state officials, an exploiter of workers, and a potential accomplice to violations of fundamental human 
rights”); see also Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic 
Perspectives from the NGO Community, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1265 (2004) (outlining key areas of 
action for NGOs to increase corporate regulation). 
67 See Van Harten Statement, supra note 64; SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 82, 229–30, 313; 
DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, INVESTMENT RULES AND 
DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 208, 223–37 (2008). 
68 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37; see also Biography of Professor M. Sornarajah, NAT’L UNIV. OF 
SING., available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/about_us/faculty/staff/staffcv/sornarajahcv2012.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2013) (rejecting the use of arbitral decisions as legal authorities by investor-state 
tribunals because these decisions impermissibly favor corporate over sovereign interests). 
69 See Van Harten Statement, supra note 64 (Professors Sornarajah, Van Harten, Schneiderman, 
and Muchlinski are the principal drafters of the document); see also Guzman, supra note 37. 
70 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 52.  On recent charges of manipulation in the appointment 
process, see Jan Paulsson, First Inaugural Lecture as Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair, 
University of Miami School of Law: Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution (Apr. 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12773749999020/paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf 
(arguing that when counsel act as arbitrators in investor-state arbitrations they are more likely to adopt 
positions beneficial to their future clients). 
71 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 239, 297. 
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“inventive” and “lost lawyers,” use litigation strategies to allegedly 
manipulate the law and demonstrate “the adverse use to which treaty 
principles could be put.”72  Consequently, tribunals “often show a near-
fundamentalist zeal for investment protection to the exclusion of other 
considerations such as economic development, human rights and the 
environment.”73  This leads to the rejection of the notion that “a small 
group of persons can foist a system on the whole world by an esoteric 
process to which others are not privy.”74  According to the critics, this 
system is as corrupt as it is opaque. 
Apart from charges of greed and manipulation, critics also reject the 
narrower notion that BIT awards could be used to cross-fertilize resolution 
of future disputes premised upon other BITs.  The concordant will of states 
is the principal basis of international law.75  In this context, they note that 
“[i]t is highly unlikely that . . . a regime has come about simply because . . . 
there is simply a lack of concordance in treaty principles.”76  Treaties 
within one program differ from each other significantly because “[m]odel 
investment treaties are redrafted with the benefit of earlier experiences.”77  
The differences only increase across treaty programs so that each treaty 
bargain will have to be interpreted ad hoc in light of its specific context.78  
Given these important differences between treaties, “arbitral tribunals or 
the writings of highly qualified publicists are not significant sources of law, 
and any theory of international law based entirely on such sources will be 
tainted with the weakness of the sources on which it is built.”79 
These critics do recognize that “[t]here is a systematic pattern in [the] 
use [of general principles of law] by arbitral tribunals and precedents have 
been built upon on the basis of past awards recognizing general 
 
72 Id. at 24–25.  A similar critique of investor-state arbitration was advanced in GUS VAN HARTEN, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 5–6, 121–85 (2007); Amr A. Shalakany, 
Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 419 (2000); see also Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the 
Transmission of Norms: The Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 685, 751–56 (2007) 
(noting that an institutional bias exists when there is an issue link between investment law and, for 
example, environmental law). 
73 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 82. 
74 Id. at 303; see also Prabhakar Singh, Macbeth’s Three Witches: Capitalism, Common Good and 
International Law, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 47, 64–68 (2012) (advocating “efficient breach of international 
law” on the premise of M. Sornarajah’s analysis). 
75 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 88–143. 
76 Id. at 179. 
77 Id. at 182. 
78 Id. at 186–87; see also Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign 
Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1610 (2009) (noting that 
the primary problem is the “increasing tendency of analysts to view BIT promises as not simply lex 
specialis, binding only between treaty partners, but as both indicative of and constituting a universal, 
one-size-fits-all, customary international law of foreign investment.”). 
79 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 290. 
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principles.”80  They accept the “existence of some general principles” that 
“cannot be denied.”81  But even these general principles do not save the use 
of prior decisions by arbitral tribunals because the “principles which have 
been extracted have been challenged as being based on the subjective 
choices of individual arbitrators and scholars predisposed to building up a 
system of investment protection.”82  Thus, “[t]he idea that a contract made 
by a state is defeasible in the public interest is demonstrably common to all 
legal systems” but not reflected in the general principles applied by 
international tribunals.83 
The end goal of this line of criticism is to strengthen the state’s 
regulatory power and limit the potential of international legal liability for 
what the authors consider to be the inherent regulatory right of the state.  It 
limits the scope of international review of state conduct towards foreign 
nationals.84  Its appeal to sovereignty is premised nearly exclusively upon 
the primacy of state conduct.85  This conduct is argued to support the idea 
that absolute sovereignty is required to protect environmental norms and 
human rights, which are goals that would be unprofitable for multinational 
corporations to protect.86 
 
2.  The Descriptive Flaw of the Critique 
 
The critique of investor-state arbitration cannot substantiate the central 
claim of bias or manipulation empirically.  The statistics provided by the 
main investor-state arbitration institution, the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), report that 23% of ICSID 
investor-state disputes are dismissed at the jurisdictional or screening 
stage.87  In fact, investors receive any kind of recovery in only 48% of 
cases.88  In the majority of these 48% of cases in which investors do 
 
80 Id. at 86. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 292.  For further discussion of the historical challenges to general principles of law in 
disputes between host states and investors, see Georges Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of 
Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 575 (1989); Jarrod Wong, 
Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the 
Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 135 (2007). 
83 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 293, 296. 
84 Id. at 290, 299–300. 
85 Id. at 299, 313. 
86 Id. at 55–60 (“Once it is conceded that multinational corporations can both benefit and harm 
economic development, it is easy to adopt the position that foreign investment should be harnessed to 
the objective of economic development and must be carefully regulated to achieve this end.”). 
87 ICSID, ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS (ISSUE 2012-2) 13, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocume
nt&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English32 (last visited Apr. 23, 2014). 
88 Id. 
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recover, they recover at a rate significantly below their asserted damages 
claim.89 
Recent surveys of investor-state arbitrations have found that the win-
loss ratio of host states in investor-state arbitrations does not significantly 
differ from the win-loss ratio in other types of legal proceedings.90  
Development of the parties was a statistically insignificant factor, i.e., the 
surveys are not skewed by the presence of developed countries as investor-
state arbitration respondents.91  The charge that appointment of a small 
cabal of elite arbitrators “foisted” a regime that is “zealously” in favor of 
international investors has similarly been debunked as flatly inconsistent 
with the set of awards rendered by “elite arbitrators.”92 
The asserted weakness of arbitral awards as a source of international 
law is also inconsistent with the voluntarist paradigm the critics appear to 
espouse.  Both investors and host states routinely rely upon such awards.93  
States invoking investor-state awards as authoritatively supporting their 
case have included least-developed states,94 developing states,95 developed 
states,96 Asian states,97 European states,98 North American states,99 South 
 
89 See, e.g., Linda A. Ahee, Leonardo Giacchino & Richard E. Walck, Historical Analysis of ICSID 
Concluded Cases, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. (2011). 
90 See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 48–52 (2007); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring 
Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 81 (2010). 
91 Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 435, 465 (2009). 
92 Kapeliuk, supra note 90, at 81 (2010) (“The results thus show that arbitration tribunals involving 
elite arbitrators do not have a tendency to render compromise awards.  Moreover, since most awards 
dismissed all investors’ claims and more than 80% of all decisions rendered an award of less than 40% 
of the amount claimed, the results clearly do not support the claim that investment-arbitration tribunals 
display a tendency to rule in favor of investors.”). 
93 For further discussion, see infra Part III. 
94 See, e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 430–432, 
438 (July 24, 2008) (Tanzania relying on Waste Management v. Mexico as an analogous case with 
regard to the fair and equitable treatment and expropriation claims, Azinian v. Mexico as a relevant 
analogue for the expropriation claim, and Tecmed v. Mexico as a relevant authority with regard to the 
requirement of permanence of a measure to constitute an expropriation).  Tanzania is a developing 
country. See List of Developing Countries, USAID (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/310maa.pdf (listing Tanzania as a low income country). 
95 See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 2.3, 285 (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf (Mongolia relying on the discrimination standard set out in 
Champion Trading v. Egypt, Sempra v. Argentina, and the expropriation standard set out in LG&E v. 
Argentina).  Mongolia is a middle low-income country.  See List of Developing Countries, USAID  (Feb. 6, 
2012), http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/310maa.pdf. 
96 See infra Part III.B.2, discussing the submissions of the United States on the content of the 
international minimum standard of treatment in Glamis. 
97 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 
¶ 288 (Aug. 16, 2007) (Philippines relying on the definition of “investment” in Salini Costruttori S.p.A. 
and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco). 
98 Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. Czech Republic, Award, ¶ 258 (Nov. 12, 2010) (Czech 
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American states,100 and African states.101  State behavior thus gives greater 
importance to arbitral decisions than critics deem appropriate.  This change 
in behavior, in and of itself, means that a purely descriptive theory of 
international law premised upon the actions of states would not support the 
narrow conclusion that arbitral decisions are a “weak” source of law 
without support in state practice. 
 
3.  The Normative Flaw of the Critique 
 
The critical project’s normative flaws mirror those of the customary 
international law thesis.  Like the customary international law thesis, it 
ultimately must admit that it “cannot be denied” that IIAs and arbitral 
awards interpreting them have created a reality that is at least partially at 
odds with the critical paradigm.102  Like the customary international law 
thesis, the critical project hunts for snippets of state practice to affirm the 
primacy of strong sovereignty.103  Like the customary international law 
thesis, it assumes that its criteria for snippet hunting are ultimately correct 
without explaining why it chose those criteria. 
The problem for critics is that they assume, rather than substantiate, 
the claim that strong sovereignty is preferable to strong property protection.  
Critics assume that development in least developed states would improve if 
regulatory power were left exclusively to host state governments.104  This 
presumption then feeds back into the negative view of IIAs that precisely 
negotiated away from this policy presumption.105  But this assumption is 
neither defended nor ultimately empirically defendable.106 
Again ironically, a voluntarist paradigm is used as a bulwark against 
treaty practice in a way that reveals a principled preference for weaker 
investment protection provisions on the part of its champions.107  The 
critique thus repeats the same mistake as the theory it attacks, crippling the 
 
Republic explaining “that the vast majority of investment treaty awards have limited the obligation of 
full protection and security to ensuring the physical safety of the investment property and personnel in 
the host state consistent with the resources available to the host state, which Respondent notes is in line 
with the historical development of the standard in customary international law”). 
99 See infra Part III.B.2, discussing the submissions of the United States on the content of the 
international minimum standard of treatment in Glamis. 
100 Brandes Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/3, Award, ¶ 72 (Aug. 2, 2011) 
(Venezuela relying on Plama v. Bulgaria). 
101 Jan de Nul NV & Dredging Int’l NV v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award, ¶ 182 (Oct. 
24, 2008) (Egypt relying on Lowen v. United States and Saipem v. Bangladesh regarding exhaustion of 
remedies). 
102 SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 86. 
103 Id. at 297. 
104 See, e.g., SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 67, at 223–37. 
105 See, e.g., Van Harten Statement, supra note 64. 
106 See infra note 133. 
107 See, e.g., Van Harten Statement, supra note 64. 
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ability of states and others to use international law as a problem solving 
tool. 
This does not mean that the purely critical insights of proponents of 
this view can be dismissed out of hand.  They rightfully point out over-
generalizations and deep lacunae in the theories presented by others.  It is 
in these “critical” elements that the doubters of current conceptions of 
“investment law” largely do and should succeed. 
 
C.  Grand Bargains and Self-Contained Regimes 
 
Current scholarship seeks the middle ground between these extremes.  
Its insight is that there exists an “epistemic community” of international 
lawyers and scholars focusing their practice and research on international 
investment law issues.  This “epistemic community” is a “network[] of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that 
domain.”108  To this epistemic community, the network of approximately 
3,000 IIAs created a self-contained international legal regime.109  This 
regime forms the background conditions for all future interpretation of 
IIAs.110 
This regime is less than full-fledged customary international law, i.e., 
regime theory addresses “the strong similarity among treaties and the 
common concepts, language, structure, and processes they employ” but 
“[w]ithout resolving the debate as to whether or investment treaties 
constitute customary international law.”111  But it nevertheless rejects the 
claims of critical movement that IIAs should be treated as purely bilateral 
bargains.112 
 
108 JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 13 (2010) (quoting Peter M. Haas, 
Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3 
(1993)) [hereinafter SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES]; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging 
Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 465–66 (2010). 
109 See SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 5. 
112 STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 280–
81 (2009); SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 8–11.  The champions of this 
theoretical approach include Professor Jeswald Salacuse of the Tufts Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy and Dr. Stephan Schill of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 
International Law in Heidelberg.  See Biography of Professor Jeswald Salacuse, THE FLETCHER SCH., 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Directory/CVs/cv_Salacuse_Jeswald.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 
2013); Biography of Dr. Stephan W. Schill, MAX PLANCK INST., http://www.rzuser.uni-
heidelberg.de/~p00/down/cv_schill.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2013); see also Commission, supra note 3, 
at 136–41; Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty 
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 49 (2013) (arguing that “investment system exists at the intersection of 
multiple fields, and it will not achieve adulthood until participants embrace and theorize its sui generis 
platypus-like nature or transfigure it into some other animal altogether”).  For further discussion of 
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1.  Self-Contained Regimes in General International Law 
 
The invocation of a “regime” of investment protection in international 
law, like the invocation of customary international law, has to be placed in 
context.  The growth of international law caused several scholars to warn of 
the risk of a loss of the coherence and normative force international law, 
leading to its ultimate fragmentation.113  Self-contained regimes are a unit 
into which international law could break off or “fragment”—the fact and 
implications of their existence have stirred significant controversy in its 
own right to the point of making fragmentation of international law an 
object of study for the United Nations’ International Law Commission 
(ILC).114 
The ILC observed a state of significant terminological confusion.115  A 
self-contained regime narrowly refers to a special set of rules concerning 
the consequences of a violation of an international legal obligation.116  
Alternatively, it “refer[s] to interrelated wholes of primary and secondary 
rules, sometimes referred to as ‘systems’ or ‘subsystems’ of rules that 
cover some particular problem differently from the way it would be 
covered under general law.”117 In the event of such a subsystem, the 
complex subject matter of the field in fact requires expertise beyond what 
general international lawyers (such a judges on the International Court of 
Justice) possess.118  In this broader sense, a self-contained regime has 
“effect predominantly through providing interpretive guidance and 
direction that in some way deviates from the rules of general law.”119 
The “interpretive guidance” provided by a self-contained regime 
partially displaces the traditional “systematic integration” in treaty 
 
Clash of Paradigms, see Frederic G. Sourgens & Baiju S. Vasani, Doubling Down on Deference? 
Treatment Standards and the Public Law Fallacy, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. (2013). 
113 See, e.g., Weil, supra note 28, at 430 (With regard to “fragmentation of normativity,” the author 
notes that “[a] normativity subject to unlimited gradation is one doomed to flabbiness, one that in the 
end will be reduced to a convenient term of art, covering a great variety of realities difficult to grasp.  
Like the ‘variable legal authority’ of subnormative acts, the graduated normativity of normative acts is a 
notion so elusive as to escape comprehension.”).  For an historical survey of fragmentation in 
international law, see Rao, supra note 35, at 931–39; Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and 
the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483, 483–85 (2006). 
114 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 
11, 2006, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC Fragmentation]. 
115 Id. at 68. 
116 Id.  On the derogation from such “secondary rules,” see Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 
483. 
117 ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 68. 
118 See Rao, supra note 35, at 944–45 (quoting Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting the Sovereign States 
and the Running a Tight Courtroom, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 121, 122 (2001)). 
119 ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 70. 
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interpretation.120  Such systemic integration requires that other international 
legal obligations of the parties be taken into account in interpreting the 
treaty language at issue in a given case.121  In a self-contained regime, 
systemic integration operates when there is a renvoi to general international 
law (such as, for example, the meaning of statehood).122  Barring such an 
immediate intersect with general international law, interpretation first and 
foremost makes the treaty provision coherent with the remainder of the 
subsystem—even if that sub system does not contain any relevant legal 
obligations between the parties in question.123  It is when this integration 
does not resolve how interpretation should proceed that other sources of 
international law will be consulted.124 
 
2.  International Investment Law as a Self-Contained Regime 
 
The “regime” theorists of international investment law assert that the 
web of approximately 3,000 IIAs and the jurisprudence under them has led 
to the creation of a regime in this stronger sense.125  IIA awards take 
precedence over and displace systemic integration under the Vienna 
 
120 Id. at 70, 80; see also Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 488 (“[B]oth the International 
Court of Justice and the Claims Tribunal, in a first step, examined the content of the rule of general 
international law and considered, in a second step, whether states in the particular case had derogated 
from this standard by creating a more special set of rules.  Tribunals established under a special legal 
subsystem—such as WTO panels or the European Court of Justice—generally follow the reverse order 
of examination.  They are primarily concerned with the content of ‘their’ special law.”). 
121 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]; see also ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 206–43; RICHARD K. 
GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 260–76, 278–81, 284–87 (2008). 
122 See ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 96 (“To press upon a perhaps self-evident point, 
there is no special ‘WTO rule’ on statehood, or a ‘human rights notion’ of transit passage, as little as 
there is a special rule about State immunities within the European Court of Human Rights or a WTO-
specific notion of ‘exhaustible resources.’”). 
123 See VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(4); see also ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 82; 
GARDINER, supra note 121, at 291–98; see also Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
999, 1014 (2004) (“In contrast to the courts of developed Nation-States that guarantee legal unity, 
globally dispersed courts, tribunals, arbitration panels and alternative dispute resolution bodies are so 
closely coupled, both in terms of organization and self-perception, with their own specialized regimes 
in the legal periphery that they necessarily contribute to a global legal fragmentation.  These conflicts 
are a result of the ‘poly-contexturalization’ of law.  They are created by the different internal 
environments of the legal system, which, for their part, are dependent upon multiple paradigms of social 
ordering.”); cf. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 505 (The authors summarize the regime 
approach as having “a certain scepticism towards any attempt to ‘smuggle’ alien elements into the 
regime. Making use of norms outside the regime is more of an ‘emergency operation’ than a desirable 
practice.  Tribunals established under particular regimes thus tend to apply a presumption in favour of 
complete and exhaustive regulation in the respective regime.”). 
124 ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 82, 97–99. 
125 SCHILL, supra note 112, at 280–81; SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 
108, at 8–11. 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties.126  Thus, the regime approach 
legitimizes current arbitral practice against the critical movement.127 
Regime theorists argue that state actors purposefully set up an 
independent, internally consistent international investment law regime.  
Historically, IIAs show a conscious effort on the part of states to create 
uniform textual bases for their IIAs by using the same draft multilateral 
conventions as the basis of their own bilateral model treaties.128  
Functionally, the parallel legal structures reflect an agreement on common 
principles, norms, rules, and dispute resolution mechanisms.129  
Doctrinally, the historical and functional “multilateralization” of formally 
bilateral IIAs is justified by reference to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
clause, included in the IIAs.130 
The result of the regime approach is a purposive recasting of investor-
state decisions to meet the ultimate principle of increased prosperity for the 
treaty states through clear rules, i.e., “a promise of protection of capital in 
return for the prospect of more capital in the future.”131  This principle is 
 
126 See supra notes 123–125. 
127 See supra notes 123–125. 
128 SCHILL, supra note 112, at 40–41, 65, 70–71, 90. 
129 SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 8 (The basic “principle” of the 
regime is the grand bargain “that clear and enforceable rules that protection foreign investors reduce 
investment risk, and a reduction in risk, all other things being equal, promotes investment.”).  Salacuse 
warns that “[b]y principles, regime theorists mean something different from what lawyers and legal 
scholars usually understand by that term.  Within the context of international regimes, principles may be 
defined as ‘beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.’  Regimes are based on a belief by their participants 
that cooperation in a particular area will lead to some desired outcome.”  Id. at 6–7.  Next, this approach 
identifies bilateral investment treaty treatment standards as the “norms” of the regime.  Id. at 9–10.  
Salacuse explains that “[n]orms in regime theory are defined as ‘standards of behavior defined  in terms 
of rights and obligations.’”  Id.  The rules of the regime are the application of the vague norms in 
specific situations.  Id. at 10.  Investor-state dispute resolution is the decision-making procedure of the 
regime.  Id. at 10–11.  On the relationship between political-science regime theory in political science 
and self-contained regimes in international law, see Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 502. 
130 SCHILL, supra note 112, at 122.  As such, “MFN clauses affect the structure of the international 
economic order and impact the system of international investment protection by supporting the 
emergence of a uniform international investment regime.”  Id. at 124.  They do so by attracting 
selectively the most favorable investor protection from any IIA signed by the host state and piecing 
together the best possible treaty from the investor’s vantage point, thus extending protection to investors 
potentially beyond the strongest combination of protections contained in any one treaty.  Id. at 140, 159.  
Schill further submits that the liberal corporate structuring requirements to fall within BITs further 
support the multilateralization of the regime because it does not create significant barrier to entry.  See 
id. at 197–240. 
131 See, e.g., SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 111 (“Thus, an 
investment agreement between a developed and a developing country is founded on a grand bargain.”).  
Salacuse concludes after econometric analysis of U.S. outflows of investment to BIT countries that the 
grand bargain does in fact work, noting an increase in investment flows of approximately $1 billion per 
annum following conclusion of a U.S. bilateral investment agreement.  See Jeswald W. Salacuse & 
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 109 (2005); see also SCHILL, supra note 112, at 43–44, 106–
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critical to defend the existence of the regime.132  It also provides the focal 
point for its application.133 
 
3.  The Flaws of the Regime Approach 
 
The most challenging problem for the regime approach is the need for 
substantive coherence and convergence within the regime, i.e., like cases 
must be decided alike.134  Absent such coherence, it is questionable whether 
an “epistemic community” exists at all.135  Further, absent coherence, the 
regime could provide severely limited interpretive guidance because a later 
decision maker cannot identify a “seamless web” into which it could 
integrate its new decision.136 
Scholars widely comment upon the increasing divergence between IIA 
awards.137  They view divergence as the most important legitimacy problem 
 
20, 278, 288, 300.  Other studies conclude the opposite, i.e., that bilateral investment treaties have no 
effect on investment flows.  See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011) 
(arguing that BITs have little to no effect on FDI premised upon underwriting decisions of political risk 
insurance providers and decisions by in-house counsel in large U.S. corporations); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a 
Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 454–55 nn.7–8 
(2007). 
132 SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 8. 
133 SCHILL, supra note 112, at 293–356. 
134 See id. at 293. 
135 To the extent that the academic community has identified a core “principle,” that the protection 
of investment leads to promotion of investments and beneficial development, it is unclear what they 
mean by this credo.  More worryingly, its empirical accuracy is essentially untested and perhaps 
untestable, leading to a cottage industry of dueling economic and econometric studies none of which 
appear to have changed the mind of any member of the epistemic community about the role and value 
of international law in this field of application.  For a representative sample of articles, see supra note 
131.  The easy reference to markets as the driver behind global legal processes has been criticized in 
other contexts as too facile.  See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1005.  Overall, it is 
more likely that the true policy goal behind IIAs is growth (and investment protection), rather than 
simple economic development.  These policy goals include foreign policy realignments, as well as 
deeper realignments with regard to the importance of property rights for the construction of a 
sustainable civil society whether globally or locally. 
136 See VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(4); see also ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 82; 
GARDINER, supra note 121, at 291–98; see also Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1014; 
cf. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 505 (The authors summarize the regime approach as having 
“a certain scepticism towards any attempt to ‘smuggle’ alien elements into the regime.  Making use of 
norms outside the regime is more of an ‘emergency operation’ than a desirable practice.  Tribunals 
established under particular regimes thus tend to apply a presumption in favour of complete and 
exhaustive regulation in the respective regime.”). 
137 See, e.g., Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 17; David A. Gantz, An Appellate 
Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39, 44 (2006); Suzannah Linton & Firew Kebede Tiba, The International 
Judge in an Age of Multiple International Courts and Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 407, 458–61 (2009); 
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Sphere: The Standard 
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of the entire IIA enterprise.138  The central factual premise of regime 
theorists is thus heavily contested ground.139 
And the composition and practice of investor-state tribunals directly 
contradicts the existence of a self-contained regime.  Investor-state 
tribunals are composed of international law and commercial law 
generalists.140  They unquestioningly apply the general law of state 
responsibility.141  Their decisions adopt legal rationales that borrow 
problem solutions from other areas of international law through systemic 
integration, including general international law, human rights law, and 
trade law.142  In fact, hard cases in investor-state disputes are resolved 
along similar lines as international legal disputes in completely different 
areas of international law, such as border disputes and continental shelf 
disputes.143 
 
of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 300 (2010); Leah D. Harhay, 
Investment Arbitration in 2021: A Look to Diversity and Consistency, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 89 (2011); José 
E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223, 244 (2011) [hereinafter Alvarez, The 
Return of the State]. 
138 See infra note 139. 
139 The proposed response has two prongs.  First, it posits that empirically, there are comparatively 
limited instances of divergence given that there is no unifying mechanism of results.  This rejoinder is 
not convincing given its own perceived need for qualification.  See SCHILL, supra note 112, at 293.  
Further, the frequency of dissent within arbitral circles is notoriously increasing, not decreasing, so 
much so that dissenting has itself become a subject of academic study.  See, e.g., Albert Jan van den 
Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO 
THE FUTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN (Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).  Second, it 
submits that dissent is not premised upon a bilateral rationale but upon a different view of the role of 
international investment law as whole.  SCHILL, supra note 112, at 356.  This rejoinder reveals deep 
fissures within the epistemic community upon which the entire regime hypothesis rests.  If members of 
the epistemic community do not agree as to the principles, norms, and rules applicable to these disputes 
but insist on globally different principles, norms, and rules, international investment law is the 
battleground of regime conflict rather than the result of regime creation.  See supra note 108. 
140 See Rao, supra note 35, at 946 (quoting Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting the Sovereign States and 
the Running a Tight Courtroom, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 121, 122 (2001)).  Former members of the 
International Court of Justice frequently sit in ICSID arbitrations, as do human rights lawyers, 
international trade lawyers and commercial arbitrators.  See generally Goldhaber, supra note 24. 
141 The Argentine decisions discussed supra Part III.B.1 are one example of this fact.  The 
interpretation of the non-precluded measures clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, as reflecting the 
customary international law standard codified in ILC Draft Article 25 on State Responsibility, 
evidences that tribunals (and parties) instinctively view political risk disputes governed by international 
law as subject to the same secondary rules as any other area of international law.  In the instance of the 
Argentine cases, several annulment decisions have noted that the specific wording of the non-precluded 
measures clause in question requires a different interpretation.  This conclusion, however, precisely 
confirms rather than weakens the general point: these committees did not hold that the law of state 
responsibility as a general rule does not apply.  It would apply if not displaced by express treaty 
language.  For further discussion, see, for example, Michael D. Nolan & Frédéric G. Sourgens, The 
Limits of Discretion? Self-Judging Emergency Clauses in International Investment Agreements, in Y.B. 
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 362 (Karl Sauvant ed., 2011). 
142 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
143 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 258–72 (noting that “nationalization of foreign property 
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Investor-state arbitration descriptively bears none of the hallmarks of 
a strong self-contained regime.  Divergence of IIA decisions appears to be 
a far greater problem than it admits.  IIA tribunal members are drawn not 
from a specialist field, but instead are generalists.  And the practice of IIA 
decisions relies heavily on systemic integration, which regime theory 
precisely seeks to displace.144  The regime theory is thus left to argue that 
an epistemic community of IIA lawyers should exist.  Its explanation why 
remains outstanding. 
That is not to say that IIA disputes do not bear a resemblance to some 
of the characteristics of self-contained regimes.  The relevance of IIA 
awards to the interpretation of an IIA of third parties is in fact critical to the 
legal strategy of counsel of both parties and is reflected in the resulting 
awards of tribunals in most occasions.  An “epistemic community” does 
exist.  But its ties are not as strong as posited by either the regime or 
multilateralization theories.  Membership in this epistemic community is 
one of many roles held by its members—and in many instances is 
comparatively the weaker membership in the context of a potential role 
conflict.145  Though tempting, reliance upon a self-contained regime theory 
to explain the current role of international law in the resolution of political 
risk disputes is inaccurate.146 
 
D.  The Critical Knot 
 
The structural problems faced by all three theories addressing the 
development of international investment law are reflected in an aporia 
regarding general international law.147  Martti Koskenniemi posits that 
international law is both over and under-determined because it argues from 
mutually incompatible assumptions.  Koskenniemi begins his examination 
with a dilemma: international law assumes that it can be simultaneously 
“concrete” and “normative,” meaning that law is verified “not against some 
political principles but by reference to the concrete behaviour, will and 
 
provides a further example” of the constructivist approach taken by the International Court of Justice in 
resolving continental shelf delimitation disputes). 
144 For examples, see infra notes 185–205. 
145 ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 71 n.168 (noting that a clash between special regimes 
would “appear as a clash of rationalities” and that “fragmentation of international law would articulate a 
rather fundamental aspect of globalized social reality itself—the replacement of territoriality as the 
principle of social differentiation by (non-territorial) functionality”); see also Fischer-Lescano & 
Teubner, supra note 123, at 1004 (“At core, the fragmentation of global law is not simply about legal 
norm collisions or policy-conflicts, but rather has its origin in contradictions between society-wide 
institutionalized rationalities, which law cannot solve, but which demand a new legal approach to 
colliding norms.”). 
146 See, e.g., Rao, supra note 35, at 958–60 (confirming studies that reveal that specialized tribunals 
do not deviate in their legal approach from the outlook of other international law courts and tribunals). 
147 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1. 
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interest of States” and remains “opposable to State policy.”148  Following 
this dichotomy, Koskenniemi submits that arguments can be “descending” 
from “a given normative code which precedes the State and effectively 
dictates how a State is allowed to behave,” or “ascending” by attempting to 
“construct a normative order on the basis of the ‘factual’ State behaviour, 
will and interest.”149  He submits that both patterns are “exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive.”150 Koskenniemi argues that international legal 
argument (and international legal decisions) includes both assumptions 
because it seeks to be both concrete and normative.151  As such, it is 
incoherent because “it incorporates contradictory assumptions about what 
it is to argue objectively about norms.”152  Using this dichotomy, 
Koskenniemi concludes: 
 
In situations of uncertainty (hard cases) we are thrown back into 
having to argue both what the law’s content is and why we 
consider it binding on the State.  To avoid utopianism, we must 
establish the law’s content so that it corresponds to concrete State 
practice, will and interest.  But to avoid apologism, we must 
argue that that it binds the State regardless of its behaviour, will 
or interest.153 
 
Koskenniemi’s discussion of his aporia in the context of customary 
international law captures the disagreement between IIA scholars whether 
customary international law exists because it explains their methodological 
disconnect of looking principally to state practice or principally to opinio 
juris.  Customary international law conceptually oscillates between a 
psychological element (opinio juris) and a material element (State practice) 
in order to suspend customary international law “between the fully 
descending (natural law) and the fully ascending (treaty).”154  The IIA 
customary international law position focused upon the treaty practice of 
states to generalize specific commitments given in a large number of 
bilateral agreements, without inquiry as to whether states are legally 
 
148 Id. at 58. 
149 Id. at 59. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 58, 65 (“The dynamics of international legal argument is provided by the contradiction 
between the ascending and descending patterns of argument and the inability to prefer either.  
Reconciliatory doctrines will reveal themselves as either incoherent or making a silent preference.  In 
both cases, they remain vulnerable to criticisms from an alternative perspective. . . . Consequently, 
doctrine is forced to maintain itself in constant movement from emphasizing concreteness to 
emphasizing normativity and vice-versa without being able to establish itself permanently in either 
position.”). 
152 Id. at 63. 
153 Id. at 66. 
154 Id. at 410. 
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obligated to make these commitments.155  It adopts a strategy that, in 
Koskenniemi’s words, “tends towards reconciliation by a tacit consent 
argument—materializing the psychological element.”156  Inferred tacit 
agreement is used to overrule actual objection (in the form of changed 
treaty commitments).157  The position falls headlong into utopianism that 
property ought to be protected.  But this position is true whether or not 
there is material state practice supporting it.  The customary international 
law argument thus is caught in the aporia. 
Koskenniemi’s challenge of sovereignty accounts for the difficulties 
of the critique of IIAs and arbitral decisions interpreting them.  Sovereignty 
“oscillates between an ascending and descending perspective on 
statehood,” i.e., “[o]ne State argues in terms of effective power” while the 
“other argues in a way which assumes the precedence of constraining 
norms to actual power.”158  At first, the critique appears to argue from the 
sovereignty of the state as effective power to justify the subjection of the 
investor to the state’s legislative, regulatory, and executive conduct.159  But 
part of the premise of the critique is to curtail the power of multinational 
corporations acting independently from their home states.160  It attempts to 
resist a perceived change in effective power.161  The constraining factors 
relied upon are a right to development and economic self-determination.162  
The critical project thus falls into the same utopianism of which it accused 
the champions of investment protection.  It, too, is caught in the aporia. 
Finally, the construction of a specialized regime of international 
investment law also does not escape the aporia.  Rather, it falls into the 
problem Koskenniemi describes in the context of treaty interpretation.  It 
also oscillates between “a subjective approach [that] treaties bind because 
they express consent” (ascending) and an “objective approach” that “they 
bind because considerations of teleology, utility, reciprocity, good faith or 
 
155 See supra Part II.A.1. 
156 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 427. 
157 Id. at 430 (“But to say that material practice creates a presumption about consent does not, by 
itself, go far enough to make that practice normative. . . . [I]f we wish to achieve the original aim of 
having a custom which binds non-accepting States, too, we must regard the presumption as non-
rebuttable.”). 
158 Id. at 225, 228. 
159 See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 388 (“Regulatory functions are a sovereign right of the 
host state, and there could be no right in international law to compensation or diplomatic protection in 
respect of such interference.”). 
160 See supra Part II.B. 
161 See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 20, 37. 
162 Id. at 297 (“Likewise, norms of international law on development will have to be addressed.  
Thus, the principle of economic self-determination which in itself is a principle enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter and elevated, at least by a group of writers, to a principle of ius cogens in modern 
international law.”)  The invocation of ius cogens signals a radical departure from the voluntarist 
paradigm, as Prosper Weil demonstrates in Towards Relative Normativity in International Law.  See 
generally Weil, supra note 28. 
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justice so require.”163  Thus, the key advance of the regime position over 
other rival conceptions of IIAs is its acknowledgment of an “objective” 
starting point that conditions an essentially teleological interpretation 
towards the coherence and convergence of an inherently “neoliberal” 
international investment law.164  This move alone, however, “provides no 
solution” because we cannot “know which interpretation (which behavior, 
which teleology) manifests consents.”165  The objective approach must 
itself be justified by consent, i.e., the existence of a relevant epistemic 
community.166  This in turn means that the moment the epistemic 
community descriptively ceases to exist, so does the objective starting point 
of interpretation.  Regime theory attempts to avoid this fate by appealing to 
the rationality of the regime principles—but this appeal falls into the same 
utopianism as the customary international law and critical projects.  It, too, 
falls prey to the logic of the aporia. 
To resolve the theoretical problem of the role international law in 
settling investor-state disputes, it is necessary to either resolve or reject 
Koskenniemi’s aporia.  The theoretical approaches championed so far have 
done neither.  The remainder of the Article will propose an approach to 
resolve the problem by switching points of view from result to process, 
from deductive reasoning to inductive reasoning. 
 
III.  LAW AS PROCESS—THE PRACTICE OF INVESTOR-STATE 
TRIBUNALS 
 
The failure of the three predominant theories for investor-state 
arbitration requires a return to the drawing broad.  These three competing 
conceptions all focused on results—the award in IIA disputes.  This focus 
reveals a methodological flaw: decisions do not appear ready-made but are 
the result of a dispute resolution process.  It is this process, rather than the 
result to which it leads, that defines the system that these decisions help 
form.167  This part explores the process both in instances of affirmative 
reliance by tribunals upon earlier decisions and in instances in which 
tribunals diverge from earlier relevant decisions. 
 
 
163 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 333. 
164 See supra Part II.C.1. 
165 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 336. 
166 See id. at 333; SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 8. 
167 See, e.g., Myers McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World 
Constiutive Process: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1979) 
(using process to critique natural law and positivist positions to international law). 
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A.  Reliance Upon Earlier Decisions in Investor-State Arbitral 
Awards 
 
Express reliance by investor-state tribunals upon decisions rendered 
by other international courts and tribunals is ubiquitous.  The fact of this 
reliance is acknowledged by all three theories,168 and it is increasingly 
acknowledged in arbitral decisions themselves.169 
Studies of arbitral precedent focus first and foremost on the tribunals’ 
use of prior decisions.170  This starting point leads to imprecise results 
because a tribunal views prior decisions through the lens of the record 
created by counsel.171  The first step to understanding the use of prior 
decisions by arbitral tribunals is to understand how these decisions are 
before those tribunals in the first place: it is taking note of the instrumental 
role of counsel in assembling the legal record upon which a tribunal 
decides the dispute. 
The task of establishing the use of prior decisions by counsel is made 
 
168 See infra note 171. 
169 See Saipem SpA v. Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 67 (Mar. 
21, 2007); Noble Energy Inc. & MachalaPower Cia Ltd. v. Ecuador & Consejo Nacional de 
Electricidad, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 50 (Mar. 5, 2008); Duke Energy 
Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶¶ 116–117, 
(Aug. 12, 2008); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, 
Award, ¶ 145 (Aug. 24, 2009); Austrian Airlines v. Slovk., Final Award, ¶¶ 83–84 (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0048.pdf; Chemtura Corp. v. Can., Award, 
¶¶ 108–109 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0149_0.pdf; 
Abaclat v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 293 (Aug. 4, 2011); Daimler 
Fin. Servs. AG v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, n.588 (Aug. 22, 2012); Chevron Corp. & 
Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Interim Award, ¶ 121 (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0150.pdf; see also Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mex., 
Separate Opinion of Prof. Thomas Wälde, ¶ 129 (Jan. 26, 2006), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/ita0432.pdf; Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. U.S., Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 50 
(Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0114.pdf; Suez v. Arg., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, ¶ 182 (July 30, 2010). 
170 See, e.g., SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 155 (“[I]n applying 
international law, international courts and tribunals may refer to previous judicial decisions and arbitral 
decisions to determine the applicable rules of international law.”); see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, 
Mandatory Rules of Law and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 175, 185–86 (2007); 
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 
1294–97 (2009) [hereinafter Bjorklund, Emerging Civilization] (quoting Christoph Schreuer, Diversity 
and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 10 
(Apr. 2006)). 
171 David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United 
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 689 (2004) (“Given the common 
practice of both private investors and governments in citing prior investment tribunal decisions that 
appear to favor them, it is inevitable that ICSID and other tribunals interpreting similar provisions of 
these BITs will consider and sometimes follow the NAFTA cases.”); Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis, 
supra note 17, at 1612 (endorsing David Gantz’s analysis); see also SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES, supra note 108, at 155. 
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difficult by the privacy of arbitral proceedings.  Most briefing is not 
publicly available.  Counsels’ pleading of cases must therefore be inferred 
from the awards’ recitation of arguments.172  The recitations frequently 
obscure the use of authorities by counsel.  In many instances, it is 
impossible to recreate it.173 
Available evidence shows that counsel have two principal goals when 
relying upon jurisprudence. First, counsel’s “central contribution lies in 
finding the place where the facts and the law intersect to yield the outcome 
sought by the client in the arbitration.”174  This contribution requires that 
counsel find analogous cases that make record facts relevant to the legal 
claim or defense advanced.  This use of decisions by counsel focuses 
principally on the conduct of the parties and supports how the parties’ 
behavior produces a normative result.175 
It is unsurprising that counsel would and do rely upon prior BIT 
determinations that address the same underlying conduct of the respondent 
state, if such determinations are available.176  These decisions are most 
directly relevant to the dispute at bar.  Counsel next draw upon decisions 
 
172 The problem created by the relative dearth of such material was noted for example by Professor 
Strong in the context of international commercial arbitration.  See S. I. Strong, Research in 
International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 
128 (2009) (“Thus, historically speaking, outsiders operated under a double handicap, not only lacking 
the reference materials from which to craft their legal arguments but also lacking the specialized know-
how on how to conduct their research.”); see also James E. Castello, Report on the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Working Group, 63 JUL- DISP. RESOL. J. 7 (2008) (noting that “NGOs proposed adding the 
following rules for investor-State arbitrations that arise under a multilateral treaty or BIT: (1) require 
UNCITRAL to publish all pleadings (subject to limited redactions) and all awards; (2) open all hearings 
to the public; and (3) authorize tribunals to accept submissions from amici curiae”).  The most notable 
exception to this general rule is that pleadings in NAFTA cases are generally available.  In addition, 
some other materials are known to counsel in investor-state arbitrations, their legal experts, and—
obviously—arbitrators.  The conclusions gleaned below from specific summaries in arbitral awards are 
consistent with the author’s experience as a participant in investor-state arbitrations. 
173 For 2012 decisions that do not recite the use of authorities by counsel in the merits context, see 
Bosh Int’l, Inc. & B&P Ltd. Foreign Inv. Enter. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, Award (Oct. 22, 
2012); Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, Award (Aug. 17, 2012); Swisslion 
Doo Skorpe v. Maced., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/16, Award (July 6, 2012). 
174 GUILLERMO AGUILAR ALVAREZ, Effective Written Advocacy, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 195, 203 (R. Doak Bishop & Edward G. Kehoe eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
175 See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 226–229, 302, 305 
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf. 
176 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 273–274, 346, 
376 (Sept. 18, 2007) (recounting significant discussion by the parties of the earlier CMS v. Argentina 
and Enron v. Argentina decisions addressing liability of Argentina arising out of its response to the 
2001 financial crisis similarly at issue in the Sempra arbitration); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 192 n.259 (Sept. 5, 2008) (recounting significant reliance by the claimant 
upon the earlier Enron v. Argentina decision); see also Quasar de Valores SICA SA v. Russian Fed’n, 
SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award, ¶¶ 18, 59 (July 20, 2012) (recounting significant reliance by the 
claimant on the earlier RosInvest v. Russia award on the merits addressing the Russian Federation’s 
treatment of Yukos Oil Company similarly at issue in Quasar de Valores). 
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addressing a specific industry in the host country.177  Finally, counsel 
submit decisions addressing measures by other host governments that are 
materially similar to the measures at bar.178 
Counsel also seek to distinguish the decisions relied upon by their 
adversaries.  Distinctions of prior decisions seek to distance the problem at 
bar from the problem in the case relied upon by opposing counsel.179  Such 
distinctions frequently are factual, i.e., they point to a record fact that 
materially changes the problem of the case at bar from the one decided 
previously.180  In other instances, they seek to point to a difference in the 
 
177 See, e.g., Ulysseas, Inc. v. Ecuador, Final Award, ¶ 224 (June 12, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1019.pdf (“In short, Respondent concludes that Claimant had no 
legitimate expectation that it would be guaranteed market, profitability, price or collection of payments. 
In Respondent’s view, the reasoning in Duke v. Ecuador should thus apply here as well.”); see also id. 
¶ 160 (“Claimant refers to Noble Energy Inc. v. Ecuador, in which it was recorded that the generator 
was not operating at a profit, and to Mr. Veldwijk’s report, in which he states that he was receiving 
similar information in relation to Termoguayas.  Claimant also cites Duke v. Ecuador and Noble v. 
Ecuador, where the claimants, who had entered into contracts with Ecuador, struggled to obtain any 
collections.”). 
178 See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 268 (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf (defending against claims that the manner of passage 
of a law through the Mongolian parliament violated the Mongolia Russian Federation BIT, 
“Respondent submits that legislative processes are not within the scope of any transparency conception 
as discussed by the international investment tribunals”); Romak S.A. v. Uzb., PCA Case No. AA280, 
Award, ¶ 136 (Nov. 26, 2009) (“Romak draws support from the recent award in Rumeli Telekom A.S. 
and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, arguing that ‘a taking by the 
judicial arm of the State may also amount to an expropriation.’  Further, relying on Saipem v. 
Bangladesh, Romak argues that the courts’ refusal to enforce the GAFTA Award has destroyed 
Romak’s rights and the commercial value of its investment, and therefore constitutes expropriation.”); 
Cargill Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 256 (Aug. 13, 2009) (“Claimant asserts 
that these actions were inconsistent as they constituted a dramatic shift from Respondent’s initial 
equivalent tax treatment of sugar and HFCS.  Claimant quotes the tribunal’s holding in GAMI for 
support of its position: ‘The imposition of a new license requirement may for example be viewed quite 
differently if it appears on a blank slate or if it is an arbitrary repudiation of a preexisting licensing 
regime upon which a foreign investor has demonstrably relied.’”). 
179 See, e.g., Kevin H. Smith, Practical Jurisprudence: Deconstructing and Synthesizing the Art 
and Science of Thinking Like a Lawyer, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998) (“Successful legal research 
and analysis depends upon the ability to locate cases that a court would find factually analogous and to 
distinguish cases that a court would find factually dissimilar.  The ability to accurately assess those 
cases that a court would or would not find analogous promotes the accuracy of your prediction 
concerning: (a) the legal issue(s) raised by Able’s fact scenario; (b) the selection, interpretation, and 
statement of the applicable rules of law; and (c) the legal conclusions that result from the application of 
the rules to the facts.”). 
180 Although party argument is not recounted, the difference of opinion between the majority and 
dissent in the recent Abaclat award reveals how such distinctions are drawn by counsel in investor-state 
arbitrations.  See Abaclat v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissent of Prof. Abi-Saab, ¶¶ 101, 105 
(Oct. 28, 2011) (“Fedax is an isolated case.  It is an outlier.  But I need not expand further on whether it 
was correctly decided or not, as it is clearly distinguishable in this respect (of territorial link) from the 
present case on facts”); see also Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, 
¶ 63 (Aug. 22, 2012) (“absence of a contract between the disputing parties distinguishes the present 
case from other investor-State cases in which tribunals have had to grapple with whether the presence 
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legal instrument governing the dispute at bar that would materially alter the 
outcome of a prior, factually analogous dispute.181 
Importantly, counsel do not limit themselves to BIT disputes to set the 
frame of facts for which an interpretation of the applicable instrument 
ultimately must account.  Rather, cases have relied upon human rights 
adjudications,182 WTO determinations,183 and judgments from the 
International Court of Justice, to name but a few.184 
The decision in Paushok et al. v. Mongolia illustrates this style of 
argument and how tribunals rely upon in drafting the ultimate awards of 
investor-state tribunals.  In Paushok, Mongolia argued that the foreign gold 
miner could not claim that a 68% windfall profits tax imposed on revenue 
above a price of $500 an ounce on sale of gold violated a bilateral 
investment treaty because of the gold miner’s conduct.185  The gold miner 
upon appropriate due diligence would have had an opportunity to avoid the 
risk of taxation by entering into a stability agreement with the Mongolian 
government, but failed to do so.186  Mongolia relied upon several prior 
decisions that similarly declined liability when the investor failed to 
conclude a stability agreement.187  The Paushok tribunal ultimately 
followed this line of argument in its award, focusing on this fact as critical 
to its interpretation of the treaty’s mandate that Mongolia accord Russian 
investments fair and equitable treatment.188 
Paushok further evidences the use of non-BIT sources to frame the 
legally relevant facts for which an interpretation of an IIA has to account.  
For instance, Mongolia submitted that the relevant facts to establish 
 
of a forum selection clause within a specific investment or concession agreement could ‘oust’ the 
jurisdiction of a BIT-based arbitral tribunal with respect to claims concerning violations of the 
contractual agreement”); Occidental Petrol. Corp. & Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶ 418 (Sept. 24, 2012). 
181 See discussion of NAFTA cases regarding the scope of fair and equitable treatment infra. 
182 See, e.g., Quasar de Valores SICA SA v. Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award, ¶ 13 
(July 20, 2012) (Respondents relied upon ECHR decision in its favor in Yukos v. Russia with regard to 
part of the factual allegations raised by the claimants in the arbitration). 
183 See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 192 (Sept. 5, 2008) 
(relying upon WTO-GATT case law “which has extensively dealt with the concept and requirements of 
necessity in the context of economic measures derogating to the obligations contained in GATT”). 
184 Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 175–176 (Oct. 5, 2005) 
(relying upon the ICJ ELSI case in order to determine legal standard applicable to state conduct towards 
insolvent companies, an issue in common in both cases). 
185 See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 226–229 (Apr. 28, 
2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf. 
186 Id.; Paushok v. Mong., Mongolia’s Rejoinder Pleading, ¶¶ 49–51 (Feb. 20, 2009) (on file with 
the author). 
187 Paushok v. Mong., Mongolia’s Rejoinder Pleading, ¶¶ 49–51 (Feb. 20, 2009) (on file with the 
author); see also Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 226–229 (Apr. 28, 
2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf. 
188 Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 302, 305 (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf. 
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whether Mongolia discriminated against the Russian gold miner were 
limited to examination of treatment extended to competitive and 
substitutable goods (i.e., other gold miners) rather than permitting a cross-
sectoral analysis of the treatment of oil and gas companies.189  Mongolia 
relied upon WTO jurisprudence for this delimitation of legally relevant 
facts.190  The tribunal followed the WTO approach.191 
Second, counsel relies upon jurisprudence as support for their reading 
of a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty.  This use is the most 
prevalent when prior decisions are sharply divided over their interpretations 
of facially similar treaty language or the content of customary international 
law.  The most heavily litigated issues falling within this second category 
are the meaning of so-called umbrella clauses requiring host states to 
observe any obligation they have assumed with regard to specific 
investments in its territory by investors of the other contracting party.192  
Further, the content of the so-called customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment particularly in the context of NAFTA has led to sharp 
disagreements.193  Another frequently litigated issue concerns the scope of 
non-precluded measures clauses and the defense of necessity under 
customary international law.194  Counsel addressing claims involving these 
issues as a general rule submit and discuss the canon of decisions favoring 
their interpretations and refine that jurisprudence to improve their odds of 
persuading their respective tribunals.195 
 
189 Id. ¶ 266. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. ¶ 315 (“The Tribunal is of the view that, before concluding to discrimination in the present 
case, the sectors covered should relate to competitive and substitutable products, an expression 
regularly used in WTO/GATT cases.  In doing so, the Tribunal is aware of the differences between the 
Treaty and the one governing the WTO.  It merely states that such a requirement is a reasonable one to 
apply when considering allegations of discrimination.”).  The question thus was one of delimitation of 
legally relevant facts for interpretation rather than of interpretation of the treaty in and of itself. 
192 For a discussion of umbrella clause disputes, and divergent interpretations of different umbrella 
clauses, see, for example, Stephan W. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of 
Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 MIN. J. INT’L L. 1, 93–94 (2009) (submitting 
that the function of umbrella clauses “consists in opening recourse to an international dispute settlement 
forum in order to enable investors to enforce contractual and quasi-contractual promises made by the 
host State and to counter opportunistic behavior of the host State that can undermine the initially-struck 
bargain, independent of whether the host State’s breach was based on commercial or sovereign 
conduct”); see also Wong, supra note 82, at 135. 
193 For a recent discussion, see generally Margaret Clare Ryan, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United 
States and the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 56 MCGILL L.J. 919 (2011) (critiquing the 
doctrinal approach of the Glamis Gold tribunal). 
194 For a discussion, see, for example, Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 141, at 362.  See also William 
W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2008). 
195 See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/29, Award, ¶ 83 (Feb. 10, 2012) (“Respondent cites a string of cases including Siemens v. 
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Counsel again draw heavily on jurisprudence from the International 
Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice.196  They 
have pointed tribunals to decisions by human rights bodies.197  They have 
argued from WTO decisions.198  They have submitted awards from 
tribunals hearing purely contractual claims from investors against host 
states or their instrumentalities.199  They have even relied upon awards 
arising out of disputes between political risk insurers and insureds.200  
These invocations of non-BIT sources are frequently successful. 
Prior theories dealing with case law through the lens of tribunal 
practice (rather than the use of jurisprudence by counsel) captures the 
second element only.  The use of cases to set the framework for 
interpretation of relevant legal instruments goes largely unnoticed.201  As 
discussed below, it is this first aspect of problem-setting that ultimately 
helps to explain the role of international law in the resolution of investor-
state disputes without running into the traps encountered by the currently 
 
Argentina, Bayindir v. Pakistan, RFCC v. Morocco, Waste Management v. Mexico, Impregilo v. 
Pakistan and Duke v. Ecuador for the proposition that a government’s breach of contract can only rise 
to the level of a breach of the BIT if it involved an abuse of sovereign authority.”); Mobil Investments 
Canada Inc. & Murphy Oil Corp. v. Can., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/4, Decision on Liability and on 
Principles of Quantum, ¶¶ 113, 126 (May 22, 2012) (“Claimant’s principally rely on Medioambientales 
Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, and Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico.  (On the standard 
applicable under Article 1105, the Respondent relies in particular on the decisions in Glamis Gold, Ltd. 
v. U.S. and Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States to the effect that the customary international 
law standard ‘has not evolved from the ‘shocking and egregious’ standard described in Neer’ but that 
‘what is ‘egregious and shocking’ has developed since 1926.’”)). 
196 See, e.g., Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Geor., ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, 
Award, ¶¶ 487–488 (Feb. 28, 2010) (Claimant relying upon the PCIJ Case concerning the Factory at 
Chorzów for principle of full compensation for losses); Azurix Corp v. Arg., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 387 (June 23, 2006) (Respondent relying upon the ICJ ELSI case for definition of 
arbitrary treatment standard). 
197 See, e.g., Roussalis v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶¶ 131–137 (Dec. 7, 2011) 
(Claimant relying upon the ECHR decisions in Maşinexportimport Industrial Group S.A. v. Romania 
and Riabykh v. Russia in support of a BIT expropriation claim that “proceedings initiated by 
Respondent have deprived the investor of the use of his ownership by creating juridical insecurity 
through a breach of the principle of legal certainty”); see also Commission, supra note 3, at 152 
(collecting citations to non-ICSID decisions by investor-state tribunals). 
198 See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 85 (Sept. 5, 2008) 
(“Argentina submits that the term ‘necessary’ contained in Art. XI of the BIT must be interpreted in line 
with the GATT-WTO case-law, under which ‘necessary’ is not synonymous of ‘indispensable.’”); see 
also Commission, supra note 3, at 152. 
199 ICS Inspection and Control Services Ltd. v. Arg., PCA Case No. 2010-9, Award on Jurisdiction, 
¶ 145 (Feb. 10, 2012) (Respondent relying upon Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO and Texaco v. Libya). 
200 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 165 (Oct. 27, 2011) 
(Respondent relying upon arbitration between Revere Copper and the U.S. political risk insurer OPIC); 
Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 69 (June 22, 2006) 
(Claimant relying upon the Revere Copper decision). 
201 See SCHILL, supra note 112, at 347–50 (noting the practice of tribunals (rather than counsel) 
distinguishing prior awards on the facts). 
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B.  Divergence of Investor-State Arbitral Awards 
 
As discussed above, investor-state arbitral decisions have diverged—
and continue to diverge—both on their interpretation of legal standards and 
their appreciation of facts.203  Divergence can be better explained from the 
point of view of process than from the point of view of results.  What 
appears as divergence of results is, in fact, the reasonable outcome of a 
different understanding by the tribunals in question of what constitutes the 
legal problems put before them by the parties. 
This part will use the process lens to examine apparent divergence 
with regard to the two most recent, and potentially serious, instances of 
divergence.  They are (1) decisions interpreting Argentina’s invocation of a 
state of emergency in proceedings relating to measures adopted after the 
2001 financial crisis, and (2) the interpretation of Article 1105 of NAFTA. 
 
1.  The Argentine Cases 
 
The 2001 Argentine financial crisis led a multiplicity of legal 
proceedings arising out of the same government measures under the same 
underlying bilateral investment treaties.204  In all of these proceedings, 
Argentina pled that the economic emergency brought upon it by the 2001 
financial crisis precluded or excused its treaty liability.205  The most notable 
divergences between tribunals arose with regard to the interpretation and 
application of the non-precluded measures clause in the US-Argentina BIT.  
The clause states the following with deceiving simplicity: 
 
 
202 See infra Part IV. 
203 See supra Part III.A. 
204 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (Apr. 25, 2005); LG&E 
Energy Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006); Sempra Energy 
Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 18, 2007); Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, 
L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008); El Paso Energy Int’l Col. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award (Oct. 27, 2011); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of 
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (Aug. 21, 2007); 
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s 
Request for Annulment of the Award (June 10, 2010); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa 
Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic (July 30, 2010). 
205 For an overview of the events leading up to the financial crisis and the immediate response 
thereto, see J. F. Hornbeck, The Argentine Financial Crisis: A Chronology of Events, U.S. DEPT. OF 
STATE: FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8040.pdf (last visited Jan. 
24, 2013). 
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This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of 
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the 
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of 
its own essential security interests.206 
 
The majority of decisions concluded that Argentina could not invoke 
the non-precluded measures clause because Argentina did not meet the 
customary international law definition of necessity.207  The decisions in 
LG&E and Continental Casualty differed, as did the annulment committees 
in CMS and Sempra.208 
The decisions had different results for two reasons, both of which 
arise in the specific records before the respective tribunals: (1) significant 
changes in strategy by Argentina, and (2) diverging views on how 
systemically to integrate customary international law in the interpretation 
of the non-precluded measures clause.  These differences do not reveal the 
emergence of, or threat to, a consistent legal standard in investor-state 
decisions.  Instead, they reveal the importance of the “input” for the 
decision-making process of investor-state arbitrations.  Rather than speak 
to systemic legitimacy, they stand for the unremarkable proposition that 
counsel’s litigation strategy can and does affect the outcome of litigation. 
 
a.  Introduction of New Theories 
 
The Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina decision is the only 
award (as opposed to annulment decision) to reject the legal paradigm 
adopted by all prior awards.  All prior awards concluded that Article XI of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT adopted the customary international law defense of 
necessity.209  The Continental Casualty tribunal did not follow earlier BIT 
 
206 Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124, 
amended by S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2 (1993), available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_000897.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
207 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (Apr. 25, 2005); 
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 18, 2007); Enron Corp. & 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); El Paso Energy 
Int’l Col. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 27, 2011). 
208 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 213–242 
(Oct. 3, 2006); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 196–236 (Sept. 5, 2008); 
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (Aug. 21, 2007); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of the 
Award, ¶ 199 (June 10, 2010). 
209 This paradigm was later rejected in several annulment decisions discussed infra.  It is 
noteworthy that these annulment decisions are fundamentally inconsistent with the arbitral records 
before the tribunals reaching contrary decisions.   
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decisions.  Instead, it concluded the following: 
 
[T]he text of Art. XI derives from the parallel model clause of the 
U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties in turn reflect the 
formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the Tribunal finds it 
more appropriate to refer to the GATT and WTO case law which 
has extensively dealt with the concept and requirements of 
necessity in the context of economic measures derogating to the 
obligations contained in GATT, rather than to refer to the 
requirement of necessity under customary international law.210  
 
Premised upon the WTO understanding of necessity, the tribunal concluded 
that Argentina could invoke Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT with 
respect to the Corralito (bank freeze), the devaluation of the peso, and the 
pesification of U.S. dollar denominated contracts and deposits. 211 
The difference in approaches between Continental Casualty and the 
other Argentine cases arises directly out of the specific records of these 
cases.  The Continental Casualty tribunal endorsed and adopted 
Argentina’s litigation position in that proceeding; as the Award records, 
“Argentina submits that the term ‘necessary’ contained in Art. XI of the 
BIT must be interpreted in line with the GATT-WTO case-law.”212  The 
distinction between the conception of necessity in customary international 
law and in GATT-WTO case law is not commented upon in CMS v. 
Argentina,213 Sempra v. Argentina,214 Enron v. Argentina,215 or the 2011 
decision in El Paso v. Argentina.216  Argentina’s arguments raised during 
the later annulment stage strongly suggest that the distinction simply was 
 
210 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 192 (Sept. 5, 2008).  For a 
discussion of the WTO standard of necessity under Article XX of GATT 1947, see generally Dapo 
Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What Role for the 
WTO, 43 VIRG. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002); Wesley A. Cann, Creating Standards and Accountability for the 
Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a 
New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413 (2001); Raj Bhala, 
National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says, and What the United States 
Does, 19 PENN. J. INT’L ECON. L. 263 (1998). 
211 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 196–236 (Sept. 5, 2008), 
212 Id. ¶ 85 (citing Argentina’s Rejoinder, ¶¶ 409–419). 
213 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 368–371 (Apr. 25, 
2005) (discussing GATT Article XXI only to contrast the wording of that clause for purposes of 
analyzing whether Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT was self-judging). 
214 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 369, 383–385 (Sept. 18, 
2007) (same as CMS Gas award). 
215  Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 336 (May 
22, 2007) (same as CMS Gas award). 
216 El Paso Energy Int’l Col. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 27, 2011) (same as 
CMS Gas).  The hearing on the merits in El Paso predates issuance of the Continental Casualty award. 
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not pled in the earlier proceedings.217 
Approaching the substantive difference in outcome and legal 
reasoning in Continental Casualty from those in the earlier Argentine 
decisions from the point of process overcomes the apparent divergence 
problem.  From the point of view of legal process, comparing the 
Continental Casualty award and other Argentine decisions is to compare 
apples to oranges because of the fundamentally different approaches taken 
in these cases.  It is simply meaningless to speak of “divergence” between 
these decisions because they lack a common procedural denominator. 
 
b.  Difference in Factual Findings 
 
This leaves the inconsistent result reached by the LG&E tribunal, but 
this inconsistency was not caused by the adoption of a different legal 
framework.218  Rather, it follows from different factual findings made by 
the LG&E tribunal compared to other Argentine tribunals.  As the decision 
prominently notes:  
 
The entire healthcare system teetered on the brink of collapse. 
Prices of pharmaceuticals soared as the country plunged deeper 
into the deflationary period, becoming unavailable for low-
income people.  Hospitals suffered a severe shortage of basic 
supplies.  Investments in infrastructure and equipment for public 
hospitals declined as never before.  These conditions prompted 
the Government to declare the nationwide health emergency to 
ensure the population’s access to basic health care goods and 
services.  At the time, one quarter of the population could not 
afford the minimum amount of food required to ensure their 
subsistence.  Given the level of poverty and lack of access to 
healthcare and proper nutrition, disease followed.219 
 
This evidence is not commented upon in any of the other Argentine 
decisions.220 
 
217 See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶¶ 123–127 (Aug. 21, 2007) 
(discussing the framework in which the parties pled the Article XI defense); Enron Creditors Recovery 
Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 353 (July 30, 2010) (not raising as one of the annulment 
arguments that the tribunal failed to state reasons that the tribunal did not address an argument that 
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT followed the approach of GATT 1947 Article XX); Sempra 
Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for 
Annulment of the Award, ¶ 132 (June 10, 2010) (same as Enron annulment). 
218 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 261 (Oct. 3, 2006). 
219 Id. ¶ 234. 
220 See supra note 204. 
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Again the process point of view avoids the divergence problem.  The 
LG&E tribunal either differed in its appreciation of the factual evidence, or 
it was faced with different pieces of factual evidence altogether.  It is to be 
expected that different tribunals would come to different evidentiary 
conclusions.  To ascribe such differences to “divergence” is precisely not to 
understand that arbitral tribunals have a legal duty of independence in 
finding the facts upon which their resolution of the dispute hinges.221 
 
c.  Divergence in Integration 
 
The coherence and legitimacy of investor-state arbitrations has also 
been called into question by reference to three annulment decisions reached 
in arbitration arising out of the Argentine financial crisis.222  The annulment 
committees in CMS and Sempra concluded that the U.S.-Argentina BIT did 
not integrate the customary international law defense of necessity but 
created a wholly independent defense.223  The annulment committee in 
Enron further faulted the tribunal for its failure to press the parties for 
further evidence in order to establish whether there was an underlying state 
of necessity.224  These decisions evidence a fundamental breakdown in the 
ICSID control mechanism.225  They do not, however, demonstrate a need 
for either greater convergence in arbitral determinations or a symptom of a 
larger legitimacy crisis. 
To speak of divergence again is senseless from a process perspective.  
As a matter of the arbitral record, the annulment committees in question did 
not disagree with the tribunals’ treatment of arguments or evidence actually 
presented to them.226  Rather, the annulment determinations turned on 
positions that Argentina contradicted in the arbitral proceedings prior to the 
annulment stage, namely that Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT should 
not be interpreted from the starting point of customary international law.227  
 
221 NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 385 (5th 
ed. 2009) (“[F]act-finding is one of the most significant functions of an arbitral tribunal, and it is a 
function that all tribunals take seriously.”). 
222 Alvarez, The Return of the State, supra note 137, at 244; Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 
137, at 300; Harhay, supra note 137, at 89. 
223 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 130 (Aug. 21, 2007); 
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s 
Request for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 198 (June 10, 2010). 
224 Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 392 (July 30, 2010). 
225 For further discussion, see Frédéric G. Sourgens, Whose Power Is It Anyway? An Assessment of 
Article 52(1)(b) of The ICSID Convention (forthcoming). 
226 Id. 
227 See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 123 (Aug. 21, 2007) 
(“Argentina took the same approach, conflating ‘state of emergency’ and ‘state of necessity’ and adding 
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Given this procedural posture, it would not have been possible for the 
arbitral tribunals hearing the original claims to rule in the manner suggested 
by the annulment committees without depriving the claimants of due 
process of law.228  The disagreement between the awards and annulment 
decisions arises again only by the comparison of apples to oranges. 
The question whether Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
incorporates customary international law, as the majority of awards 
concluded, WTO law, as the Continental Casualty tribunal concluded, or 
an entirely independent defense, as several annulment decisions suggest, 
cannot be answered by a tribunal as an abstract legal proposition.229  As the 
recent El Paso tribunal explains, the preference for systemic integration 
reflected in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) justifies reliance upon customary international law in interpreting 
the term “necessary” in Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.230  But as the 
Continental Casualty award shows, this preference for systemic integration 
does not explain what legal rules to integrate, e.g., customary international 
law of necessity or GATT 1947 Article XX.231  This issue requires a 
tribunal to make determinations of law and record facts.  The factual 
component in particular means that a tribunal cannot do so outside of the 
specific record with which it is being presented by the parties. 
 
2.  The NAFTA Cases 
 
NAFTA Article 1105 requires each party to “accord to investments of 
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”232  
The scope of the obligation in this treaty provision has led to significant 
divergence between NAFTA arbitral tribunals.  The most recent iteration of 
this divergence arises out of the different yardstick set by the Glamis Gold 
v. U.S. and Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada decisions.233 
Current NAFTA jurisprudence unfolds against the background of an 
interpretive note, issued by the NAFTA treaty parties in reaction to earlier 
NAFTA jurisprudence.  In response to early NAFTA jurisprudence, the 
NAFTA treaty parties agreed that “[t]he concepts of ‘fair and equitable 
 
that state of necessity is included in Article XI.”). 
228 See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Annulment, ¶¶ 197–247 (Dec. 17, 2010). 
229 See supra notes 211–219. 
230 El Paso Energy Int’l Col. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 27, 2011). 
231 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 196–236 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
232 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 
2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
233 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Award (May 14, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0378.pdf; Merrill & Ring Forestry, L.P. v. Can., Award (Mar. 31, 2010), http://italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf. 
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treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”234 
The Glamis tribunal determined “the treatment of an alien, in order to 
constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to 
bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental 
action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and 
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.”235  It thereby 
adopted the standard adopted in the Neer case.236  Glamis established this 
standard on the basis of the pleadings of the U.S. (in Glamis itself),237 as 
well as legal pleadings of Mexico and Canada in prior NAFTA 
proceedings.238  The tribunal looked to state practice of the three NAFTA 
member states,239 and held that what constitutes egregious behavior on the 
part of states evolves over time.240  The tribunal determined that at the 
current point in time, “legitimate expectations relate to an examination 
under Article 1105(1) in such situations ‘where a Contracting Party’s 
conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an 
investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct. . . .’ [i.e.,] a 
State may be tied to the objective expectations that it creates in order to 
induce investment.”241 
The Merrill & Ring Forestry tribunal disagreed with the Glamis 




234 NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION, NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN CHAPTER 11 
PROVISIONS, § B (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/chap11interp.pdf; 
see also Charles H. Brower, II, Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of 
NAFTA Article 1105, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 347 (2006). 
235 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Award, ¶ 612 (May 14, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/ita0378.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted). 
236 Id. 
237 Id. ¶ 21 (“In the case of the customary international law standard of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment,’ the Parties in this case and the other two NAFTA State Parties agree that the customary 
international law standard is at least that set forth in the 1926 Neer arbitration.”). 
238 Id. ¶ 612 n.1257. 
239 This approach to custom satisfies the classicist view of customary international law in as much 
as it relies upon government statements reflecting express opinio juris.  The problem remains that the 
statements were made in a capacity as defendant in a legal proceeding and as such is not fairly to be 
viewed as the unbiased expression of the state’s view of its legal obligations.  See Roberts, Traditional 
and Modern Approaches, supra note 29.  For a discussion of the role of customary international law in 
international investment protection, see supra Part II.A. 
240 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Award, ¶ 613 (May 14, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/ita0378.pdf. 
241 Id. ¶ 621. 
242 Merrill & Ring Forestry, L.P. v. Can., Award, ¶ 204 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf. 
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State practice was even less supportive of the standard referred to 
in the Neer case.  And in the absence of a widespread and 
consistent state practice in support of a rule of customary 
international law there is no opinio juris either.  No general rule 
of customary international law can thus be found which applies 
the Neer standard, beyond the strict confines of personal safety, 
denial of justice and due process.243 
 
The tribunal expressly expanded the scope of Article 1105 of NAFTA 
beyond customary international law to include “general principles of law” 
as well.244  It noted that “[g]ood faith and the prohibition of arbitrariness 
are no doubt an expression of such general principles[.]”245  The Merrill & 
Ring Forestry tribunal thus anchored the fair and equitable treatment 
provision in a general duty of reasonableness.246 
Again, the records in Glamis and Merrill & Ring Forestry are 
instructive.  Glamis argued that a “lack of ‘transparency and candour in an 
administrative process’” violated the fair and equitable treatment standard 
by failing to accord Glamis due process.247  It is in this context that Glamis 
submitted (unsuccessfully) that the fair and equitable treatment standard 
required a showing of unreasonableness, unfairness, or injustice rather than 
egregiousness, outrage, or shock.248  The principal evidence of state 
practice relied upon by Glamis was the submission of the U.S. in the ICJ 
dispute in the ELSI case between the U.S. and Italy.249  In addition, Glamis 
submitted that “BITs are reflective of the customary international law 
standard of treatment owed to foreign investors,” meaning that the 
interpretation of other fair and equitable treatment provisions in other BITs 
would be directly relevant to the content of customary international law.250  
The U.S. rejected Glamis’s reliance upon ELSI because “the arguments 
concerning ‘arbitrary’ conduct in that case were based on lex specialis: 
Article I of the Supplementary Agreement to the Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation between Italy and the United States, on which 
the relevant claims in that case were based[.]”251  The United States 
rejected the reliance upon BITs as such as evidence of customary 
 
243 Id. 
244 Id. ¶¶ 184, 187. 
245 Id. ¶ 187. 
246 Id. ¶¶ 210, 213. 
247 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Memorial of Claimant Glamis Gold Ltd., ¶ 521 (May 5, 2006).  
248 Id. ¶¶ 526–531. 
249 Id. ¶ 530.  Glamis further relied upon other pleadings submitted by the United States in other 
NAFTA proceedings.  Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Reply of Claimant Glamis Gold Ltd., ¶ 216 (Dec. 15, 
2006). 
250 Id. ¶¶ 212–213. 
251 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Counter-Memorial of the U.S., ¶ 228 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
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international law for essentially the same reasons.252 
Merrill & Ring Forestry took a different approach to prove the content 
of Article 1105 of NAFTA, relying principally on the submission that the 
treatment prescribed by Article 1105 “is grounded in their [i.e., the NAFTA 
treaty parties’] obligation to act in good faith.”253  Merrill & Ring Forestry 
further submitted that Article 1105 could not be confined to customary 
international law, but required reference to all sources of international 
law.254  From there, Merrill & Ring Forestry submitted that the tribunal 
should look to the general principle of law of good faith in order to define 
the content of the fair and equitable treatment standard in Article 1105.255 
Like in the Argentine cases, the NAFTA cases are “inconsistent” or 
“convergent” only if they are divorced from their records.  Glamis and 
Merrill & Ring Forestry in critical respects differed in their submissions of 
how arbitrators should integrate general international law in the 
interpretation of Article 1105 of NAFTA.  The outcomes reached by the 
respective tribunals reflect this difference.  Comparing NAFTA decisions 
to each other in the abstract thus again risks comparing apples to oranges. 
 
IV.  THE COMMON LAW SOLUTION 
 
The process of investor-state dispute resolution leaves little doubt that 
investor-state arbitration forms part of a common law.256  In fact, it is not 
seriously disputed that all participants in investor-state arbitration are 
“employing styles of common law reasoning.”257  Despite this observation, 
the major theories addressing investor-state arbitration shy away from 
treating investor-state arbitration as forming part of a common law because 
 
252 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Rejoinder of the U.S., ¶ 142 (Mar. 15, 2007). 
253 Merrill & Ring Forestry, L.P. v. Can., Reply Memorial of Claimant, ¶ 193 (Feb. 13, 2008). 
254 Merrill & Ring Forestry, L.P. v. Can., Reply of Claimant, ¶ 305 (Dec. 15, 2008). 
255 Id. ¶ 313. 
256 It could be argued that international law is a mixed jurisdiction that combines aspects of the 
civilian and common law traditions.  In terms of the substance of international law in general, and the 
application of international law to political risk disputes in particular, this is certainly accurate.  It is the 
proposition of this Article that this mixed jurisdiction systemically develops as a common law 
jurisdiction would, rather than along the lines of a civilian jurisdiction.  The key factors leading to this 
conclusion are the lack of a common code of international law, the proliferation of international courts 
and tribunals (and consequently international judicial decisions), and the International Law 
Commission’s use of prior decisions from international courts and tribunals as a principal source of its 
own codification (or restatement) efforts.  See, e.g., James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on 
Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 885 
(2002).  For a discussion of the mixed-jurisdiction development of “systemic respect for jurisprudence,” 
see Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and 
Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775 (2005). 
257 See, e.g., SCHILL, supra note 112, at 361; SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra 
note 108, at 155–56; Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 45; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, 
at 377; SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 333–62. 
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of their focus on the outcome of arbitration over the arbitral process.258  It 
was this focus that caused the major theories to fail.259 
The remainder of this Article sets out how arbitral decisions in 
investor-state arbitrations reveal the development of an international 
common law that precisely overcomes the structural aporia which caused 
prior theories to fail.  It then addresses how the common law theory 
overcomes the problems raised by existing theories.  Finally, it provides a 
structurally sound and descriptively accurate account of the persuasiveness 
of jurisprudence in investor-state arbitrations. 
 
A.  International Common Law 
 
The practice of investor-state arbitration goes beyond demonstrating 
that its participants treat it as part of a common law.  Due to the wealth of 
decisional law and the variety of sources on which it is premised, it also 
demonstrates the inherent theoretical value of a common law paradigm to 
overcome the significant theoretical problems encountered by other 
conceptions of investor-state arbitration, and international law adjudication 
in general.  As discussed below, the common law paradigm is particularly 
apt for the further development of international law because of its 
principally horizontal rather than vertical structure.260  This shift to a 
common law paradigm helps to resolves a central aporia about the nature of 
general international law posited by Martti Koskenniemi in From Apology 
to Utopia by adding a new dimension.261 
 
1.  The Common Law Paradigm 
 
The key systemic difference between common law and civil law 
traditions is the manner in which legal axioms and rules are generated.  The 
civilian tradition operates principally along a vertical axis: it effectively 
argues from first principles to the rules these first principles entail.262  The 
 
258 The notable exception is CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 70–75 (2007) (citing 
Crawford, supra note 256, at 886).  Crawford in context discusses whether civil law or common law 
concepts of responsibility prevailed in the drafting of the articles.  Crawford, supra note 256, at 885. 
259 See supra Part II. 
260 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
261 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
262 See, e.g., ANTONIO GAMBARO & RODOLFO SACCO, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI 323 (2d ed. 
2002) (noting that prevalent French legal theories of the twentieth century reconciled apparently 
inconsistent legal rules through common first principles and used these first principles to generate 
additional rules of law when needed to close lacunae); HANS BROX, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BGB 27 
(29th ed. 2005) (“In an effort to prevent that the German Civil Code would become unmanageable, the 
legislator derived concrete rules from ever more general principles by means of broadening 
abstraction.”) (author translation); OLE LANDO, KORT INDFØRING I KOMPARATIV RET 204 (3rd ed. 
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coherence of the system is “vertical” because it depends upon the link of a 
rule (or decision) to the first principle.263  Consequently, interpretation in 
the civil law moves along vertical lines, establishing the coherence of a 
proposed interpretation with the axiomatic first principle and its coherence 
with the conception of this first principle evident throughout the code in 
other areas of law.264  It is a predominantly deductive paradigm.265 
Critique within civilian tradition is similarly predominantly vertical.  
It focuses on the tenability of the prevalent conception of the axiomatic 
first principle in light of the results it achieves in actual practice.266  When 
the results the conception achieves in actual practice achieves unjust 
results, the conception of the first principle changes, leading to a significant 
overhaul in the code of the jurisdiction in question, a systemic 
reinterpretation of the existing code or fragmentation.267  Given the radical 
nature of this step, civilian legal systems appear remarkably stable, with 
few but radical realignments interspersed between periods of relative 
 
2009) (“It must further be considered that German law in contradistinction to other legal systems is held 
together by the principle of good faith or reasonableness, Treu und Glauben, which is used as corrective 
when legal rules would lead to an injustice.”) (author translation). 
263 See, e.g., H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 143 (2000) (“If there is no 
Perfect Author, there are at least authors, whose ongoing arguments require ongoing response.  The 
notion that legislation and its interpretation are simply means of continuing the discussion, and not in 
any way means of bringing it an end or limiting its breadth, is brilliantly represented in recent 
continental writings.  Inter, in the sense of the search for the truest meaning, would thus remain at the 
heart of the civilian tradition, as it was in the time of Rome.”); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 88 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987) (“the Code civil is founded 
on the creed of the Enlightenment and law of reason that social life can be put into a rational order if 
only the rules of law are restructured according to a comprehensive plan”); MARCEL PLANIOL, 
TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 161 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 1959); BROX, supra note 262, at 
27; LANDO, supra note 262, at 204.  In this respect, civilian interpretation and legal development 
follows along the lines of the ideal of perfect vertical coherence found in Dworkin.  See, e.g., RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 333–54 (1986). 
264 Reasoning by analogy in civil law jurisdictions is a mode of interpretation of the Code precisely 
because the analogy works “through” the first principle.  It highlights how the first principle is at work 
in another area of law that could be applied by analogy to the question at bar.  The analogy is similarly 
“vertical” because it analytically develops the application of the first principle to the question at bar 
rather than developing a truly horizontal coherence across areas that have facially inconsistent first 
principles.  See, e.g., GAMBARO & SACCO, supra note 262, at 323; BROX, supra note 262, at 41–44. 
265 See, e.g., GLENN, supra note 263, at 133 (2000) (“deductive thought follows from this form 
logic; given a point of departure, you can reach further conclusions which are derivable from it (or 
entailed by it, some might say), in a consistent manner”). 
266 See, e.g., PLANIOL, supra note 263, at 162 (“The logical method treats all these questions as if 
they were theorems of geometry.  It uses a corps of axioms containing in themselves the salutation to 
practically all difficulties.  The disadvantage of this method is that it causes law to function as it were a 
blind piece of machinery, indifferent to the good or evil it might do.  Laws, however, are made in order 
to obtain for man the greatest possible amount of good.  A juridical science which would lead to unjust 
or dangerous solutions would be false.  It would defeat its own purpose.”). 
267 See, e.g., FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 17–18 (9th ed. 2005) (noting 
the role of jurisprudence to make such adjustments “when necessary” and noting the emergence of new, 
ever more specialized codes). 
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The common law, on the other hand, developed and develops through 
the resolution of specific problems brought forward through actual 
disputes.269  The common law tradition operates principally along a 
horizontal axis: it argues from (and towards) the coherent solution of 
related legal problems towards a common bond between them.270  The 
coherence of the system is “horizontal” because it depends upon the bonds 
between the solutions of related problems as such.271  Consequently, the 
common law moves along horizontal lines by establishing rules rather than 
“interpreting” legal rules.272  Rule establishment depends upon the 
coherence of a proposed common law rule against the facts of each cases 
relied upon by the parties.273  It is a predominantly inductive paradigm.274 
 
268 See id. (noting the historical resistance to change in French civil law of obligations outside of 
periods of significant change). 
269 GAMBARO & SACCO, supra note 262, at 132–33, 256 (noting that the common law was by its 
nature incomplete and grew through resolution of disputes); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS 11–19 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the early development of the enforcement of promises at 
common law).  This form of development of the common law is critical to understanding the casebook 
method, or contract law by anthology, currently underlying first-year U.S. law school curriculum.  See, 
e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Contract Scholarship in the Age of Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406 (1987) 
(discussing the evolution of common law of contracts scholarship through the case method since the 
publication of Langdell’s contracts casebook in 1871).  For a specific example of the historical vagaries 
of this form of legal development, see Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the 
Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985) (explaining the record-based necessity for 
the court in Lawrence v. Fox to develop the third party beneficiary rule and its infectious effect on the 
development of U.S. common law thereafter). 
270 For an extreme position, see Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common 
Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 257 (1987) (arguing that “‘the common law’ is best regarded as 
the institutionalized process of adjudication itself, rather than as the body of relatively stable (but 
nonetheless constantly changing) dispute-settling standards which emerge from that process”).  A 
similar position is espoused by Melvin Eisenberg in the context of finding morally necessary exceptions 
to announced and otherwise coherent common law rules.  See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 66–68. 
271 See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 54–55 (positing that the “announcement approach” is the 
one ordinarily followed by courts, which uses the “rule of a precedent [which] consists of the rule that it 
states, provided that the rule is relevant to issue raised by the dispute before the court”). 
272 See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN 
LAW 183–216 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1988) (“common law reasoning, like that in science and ethics, 
is non-hermeneutic in nature”); EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 52. 
273 See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 54–55, 61; see also S.L. Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical 
Cases, and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 223–24 (1990) (“The fourth stage is the heart 
of the deliberative process.  At this stage we engage in all-out theorizing, looking for hypotheses which 
account for the resolutions of issues we found in stage three [gathering settled cases that have proposed 
apparently conflicting solutions to relevant legal problems].  That is we are trying to formulate 
hypotheses about the relationships between the conflicting reasons under various different 
circumstances present in the stage three cases, which account for those resolutions.”). 
274 See Moore, supra note 272, at 183–89 (arguing for an inductive, non-hermeneutic view of 
common law precedent); DWORKIN, supra note 263, at 228–38 (analogizing the role of the judge to 
writing part of a chain novel premised solely on the earlier parts of the novel); see generally Frederick 
Schauer, Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 IOWA L. REV. 911 (1997) [hereinafter Schauer, 
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The inductive paradigm entails a different mode of rule establishment 
and, consequently, a different modality of change.275  True to the inductive 
nature of the common law, rule establishment occurs in the context of a 
new case or problem.276  Due to its inductive nature, common law rule 
establishment will problematize the facts of the new dispute in light of their 
resemblance to facts of prior decisions.277  In relating the facts at bar to 
their resemblance of facts in prior decisions, it is possible both to derive the 
principle applicable to the resolution of the dispute at bar and to confirm 
and adapt its validity in light of additional factual problems not previously 
encountered in other cases.278  In this way, the common law develops on a 
constant basis with the resolution of each new case. 
This is not to say that the common law lacks axiomatic principles or 
that the civil law is entirely static.  Both characterizations, in this extreme 
form, would caricature the legal systems in question.  Thus, the common 
law elevates the case which in its holding cleanly states an axiomatic norm 
to paradigmatic status.279  Further, the art of interpretation of civil law, or 
hermeneutics, cannot but gradually shift the meaning of civil code 
provisions so as to make the provisions meaningful to the shared social and 
linguistic experience of the jurists applying the code.280 
But the fundamental difference between the principal directedness of 
the legal system (vertical vs. horizontal) remains a necessary corollary of 
 
Prescriptions] (discussing the inductive nature of the common law in Dworkin). 
275 For the reasons discussed by Professor Eisenberg, the issue is one of “rule establishment” rather 
than “interpretation” because “the role of the deciding court in determining what rule a precedent stands 
for is not so much to determine what the precedent was intended to stand for as to determine what it has 
or will come to stand for.”  EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 52. 
276 See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 54–55, 61; DWORKIN, supra note 263, at 228–38; Moore, 
supra note 272, at 183; Perry, supra note 270, at 215. 
277 See supra note 273. 
278 See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing how this process operated in the context of 
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. and noting that the break with prior case law was appropriate because 
its “rule came to be socially incongruent, it also came to lack consistency with the body of law” in other 
areas).  It is in this sense that the common law makes “available to us no formal decision procedure 
which will make clear, in a reliable and certain way, which principles are applicable to which sorts of 
cases, what weight they carry, and concrete results they support.”  Perry, supra note 270, at 251.  The 
inductive nature of the process deprives legal argument of this kind of deductive certainty and replaces 
it with a literally pragmatic point of view premised upon the totality of possible problem solutions 
premised upon similarly cast factual problems. 
279 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of 
Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 1008, 1013 (1918) (“Although not the first case of the sort, the famous 
case of Lawrence v. Fox is now regarded as the leading authority to the effect that a creditor-beneficiary 
has an enforceable right.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 
1363 (1992) (“Although Lawrence v. Fox is often celebrated today as a landmark case that established 
the power of a third-party beneficiary to bring suit, in reality the case was not very remarkable for its 
time.”). 
280 TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 262, at 17–18. 
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the historical and analytical differences between both systems.281  
Historically, the civil law developed “from the complete opposite” starting 
point to the common law: “not from political power and its structures of 
government, but from the absence of such structures and independently 
from any existing political power.”282  The resulting system in the civil law 
is thus by origin as philosophical as the common law is pragmatic.283  Their 
structure of decision making still reflects this historical difference by 
placing primacy on different aspects of a legal dispute (factual similarity 
vs. legal fit).284 
 
2.  Investor-State Arbitration as Common Law 
 
The experience of investor-state arbitration follows the paradigm of 
the common law rather than the civil law not principally because of the 
weight given to prior cases, as others suppose, but because of the manner in 
which prior cases are employed.285  Counsels focus intensively on the 
similarity of facts at bar to the facts of prior decisions.286  It is the similarity 
of the factual situation to the earlier cases that conditions the interpretive 
question about the applicable treaty, customary international law, general 
principle of law, or unilateral act to be answered in the dispute.287  Counsels 
in investor-state arbitration problematize the facts in the way of litigation in 
the common law: adjudication turns first upon whether a proposed rule 
(treaty interpretation proffered in a prior decision relied upon by counsel, 
for example) “is relevant to the [factual] issues raised by the dispute.”288 
Through the prism of the factual dispute between the parties, the 
interpretation of legal texts such as treaties or contracts becomes a different 
enterprise.  These texts are not interpreted in a factual vacuum for abstract 
legal content, for example, “What is the content of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard in the Russia-Mongolia BIT?”289  Instead, the texts are 
 
281 The same difference is noted, in a critical fashion, by Frederick Schauer.  See Frederick Schauer, 
Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006).  The criticism he raised of the common law 
method of law making (or, in Eisenberg’s terminology adopted for purposes of this Article, rule 
establishment) is addressed further in Part IV.B infra. 
282 GAMBARO & SACCO, supra note 262, at 245 (author translation). 
283 See id. 
284 See id. 
285 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN, DON WALLACE, NOAH RUBINS & BORZU SABAHI, 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 217 (2008); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 35–37 (2012); Noemi Gal-Or, The Concept of Appeal in 
International Dispute Settlement, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 43, 48 (2008) (noting as “paradoxical” that 
international law developed on the basis of precedent while formally rejecting stare decisis). 
286 See supra Part III.A. 
287 See supra Part III.A. 
288 EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 55. 
289 See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 255 (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf (“the Tribunal will consider the interpretation of the Treaty in 
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interpreted to determine whether specific conduct established on the basis 
of record evidence and deemed legally relevant because of earlier cases 
presented by the parties (failure to conclude a legal stability agreement in 
the context of claim premised upon allegedly unfair and inequitable tax 
increases) is actionable under the specific treaty language of, for instance, 
the Russia-Mongolia BIT.290  Earlier decisions reached under different 
legal instruments thus are not principally invoked to assist in the textual 
interpretation of apparently unrelated documents; they are invoked to 
define the problem to which the legally applicable document responds.291  
The interpretive question then becomes whether specific language requires 
deviation from the solution or logic applied to the problem at bar in case(s) 
that addressed this same or similar problems.292 
The common law approach can reconcile this currently prevalent 
pragmatic approach to IIAs with the interpretive method of the VCLT.  The 
VCLT requires that the text of a treaty be interpreted according to its 
“ordinary meaning.”293  On its face, this suggests a method more akin to the 
hermeneutics of code interpretation than common law rule establishment.  
But the meaning of “ordinary meaning” itself requires interpretation.294  It 
is typically understood to require that interpretation give meaning to a term 
similar to “a person reasonably informed in that subject.”295  This causes 
the problem to regress one step because it is not going to be abstractly 
apparent what the relevant “subject” is. 
The common law approach allows for resolution of the problem of 
what “ordinary meaning” to give treaty provisions.296  By making treaty 
provisions speak to a problem, and contrasting it with existing legally 
cognizable problem solutions, the common law approach specifically 
defines the “reasonably informed person” as the one educated about the 
 
the context of the specific claims made by Claimants”). 
290 See discussion of Paushok, supra Part III.A. 
291 See supra Part III. 
292 As discussed in Part III, this is precisely the manner in which tribunals interpret IIAs.  It is this 
reliance upon prior decisions that is responsible, in significant part, for the debate between the three 
approaches discussed in Part II. 
293 VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(1). 
294 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 91 (Oct. 21, 2005) (“As Schwarzenberger observed, the word ‘meaning’ itself has at least 
sixteen dictionary meanings.”). 
295 ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 67 (2007).  Linderfalk gives, as one 
example of interpretation in accordance with a technical meaning, the interpretation of a BIT provision 
by an ICSID tribunal.  Id. at 69–70; see also GARDINER, supra note 121, at 174 (“Thus the test is not 
necessarily what the ordinary person would understand a term to mean but could take account of the 
subject matter of the treaty so as to seek what a person reasonably informed in that subject, or having 
access to evidence of what a reasonably informed person would make of the terms.”). 
296 See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 91 (Oct. 21, 2005). 
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legal problem to be answered in the dispute at bar.297  The common law 
approach avoids circularity because the establishment of the legally 
relevant problem and the legally relevant facts that an interpretation must 
address precede interpretation and overlay (through case law) an 
independent legal matrix over record assembled by the parties.298  Ordinary 
meaning interpretation is thus perfectly consistent with a common law 
approach. 
The common law approach is further supported by the requirement of 
systemic integration.299  In international law, systemic integration requires 
that an interpretation take into account other rules of international law in 
force between the parties.300   Systemic integration is a core principle of 
rule establishment in the common law setting.301  A problem-based 
approach will select the relevant “other rules of international law” from the 
legally relevant facts.302  What makes facts legally relevant is determined 
through the parties’ use of jurisprudence ascribing such legal relevance to 
alleged conduct.303 
The result of the common law paradigm is that the interpretations of 
treaties and investment contracts subject to international law, general 
principles of law, or domestic investment laws, are inherently open-
textured.304  Past interpretations of bilateral investment treaties expand the 
universe of legally relevant facts.305  Facts other than those made relevant 
by past decisions in investor-state arbitrations can become legally relevant 
through decisions in other international fora and thus expand the range of 
problems to be resolved in future bilateral investment treaty arbitrations.306 
 
297 See GARDINER, supra note 121, at 174; cf. Moore, supra note 272, at 183–216. 
298 Cf. supra Part III (describing the current interpretive approach of investment treaty tribunals in 
these terms). 
299 VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(3)(c). 
300 Id. art. 31(3)(c); see also Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279 (2005); Campbell McLachlan, 
Investment Treaties and General International Law, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 361 (2008). 
301 See supra note 125. 
302 See discussion of Argentine cases, supra Part III.B.1. 
303 See discussion of Argentine cases, supra Part III.B.1. 
304 “Open texture” is another way of expressing an indeterminacy.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).  The open texture here describes not an indeterminacy as concerns the 
resolution of a specific dispute, but rather an indeterminacy of the broader system of law.  The common 
law traditionally is precisely conceived of as incomplete (and thus expanding by including additional 
facts within the realm of the legally actionable).  Hart would banish indeterminacy to the penumbra 
only of rules of precedent, submitting that there is a core meaning as to which no indeterminacy is 
applicable.  Id. at 135.  For a critique, see generally Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 
(1988).  As discussed below, this solution to indeterminacy overstates the relative strength of rule 
establishment. 
305 See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing the innovation in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 
in similar terms). 
306 On the expanding role of international law in general, see, for example, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 
The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International 
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The common law that investor-state arbitration helps form is an 
adaptive, if chaotic, organism.307  Because of the manner that the horizon of 
rule establishment can shift with every case, the common law displays 
significant horizontal coherence.  In return, it gives up vertical coherence: 
the shifting horizon of interpretation deprives the interpretive process, and 
its result, of a strong substantive focal point.308  Nowhere is the relational, 
rather than absolute, character of this law more on display than its central 
protection of fair and equitable treatment and its identification with the 
protection of legitimate investment-backed expectations.  What is a “fair” 
or “legitimate” expectation?  The open texture of this question, its 
dependence on appraisal of a reciprocal relationship between investor and 
state, poses no problem for the horizontal conception of investor-state 
arbitration.  By contrast, in a vertically organized system, it is a question 
that simply allows no legal resolution.309 
 
3.  Law in Multiple Dimensions 
 
The common law approach, unlike the prevalent theories about 
international investment arbitration, can overcome Koskenniemi’s 
aporia.310  As discussed above, Koskenniemi’s aporia is premised upon the 
identification in international legal argument of two logically inconsistent 
premises, namely that (1) an international legal obligation is binding solely 
because of state consent to the rule (apology), and (2) states are legally 
bound by an international legal rule whether or not they object to it 
(utopia).311  Using this dichotomy, Koskenniemi concludes the following as 
 
Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 791, 794 (1999). 
307 See, e.g., Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 37–38 
(2008) (summarizing scholarship on the nature of the common law of torts as “common law, by 
changing shape with each new decision, can ‘embody the fundamental values of a society’ as those 
values shift over time and respond to developments in technology, industry, and moral reasoning.  It has 
a record of adapting over centuries to societies’ needs as they evolve: ‘It is the peculiar merit of the 
common law that its principles are so flexible and expansive as to comprehend any new wrong that may 
be developed by the inexhaustible resources of human depravity.’  An early torts scholar described the 
common law as ‘an organism which is almost purely of natural growth.’”). 
308 Rather than as a single principle, substantial unity is currently provided through open-ended, and 
internally contradictory, lists or canons of what international law seeks to achieve.  This method 
precisely evidences the lack of a single axiomatic principle (such as, for example, “sovereign equality”) 
that could serve as a vertical organizing principle for the entirety of international law.  Dupuy, supra 
note 306, at 795 (“For instance, the rules prohibiting the use of force, outlawing genocide, and 
establishing non-intervention, the rights of people, and the basic rights of the human person are parts of 
this substantial set of unifying rules.”).  Non-intervention and prohibition of the use of force facially 
contradict the prohibition of genocide.  If genocide occurs, there must be a right of intervention for the 
international legal obligation to have more than hortatory force. 
309 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 330–31. 
310 See id. 
311 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
SOURGENS_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:37 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business                            34:181 (2014) 
 
232 
a matter of theory: 
 
In situations of uncertainty (hard cases) we are thrown back into 
having to argue both what the law’s content is and why we 
consider it binding on the State.  To avoid utopianism, we must 
establish the law’s content so that it corresponds to concrete State 
practice, will and interest.  But to avoid apologism, we must 
argue that that it binds the State regardless of its behaviour, will 
or interest.312 
 
 Koskenniemi’s critique is cogent only if law is conceived of as a 
deductive enterprise.  Deductive reasoning proceeds by syllogism, i.e., an 
argument in which the conclusion follows necessarily from a major and 
minor premise.313  If the major and the minor premise in an argument 
contradict each other, the syllogism cannot be closed.  Koskenniemi’s point 
is to identify a logical inconsistency in the premises of international legal 
argument.314  The aporia therefore is problematic only to the extent that it is 
assumed that law is inherently deductive. 
Koskenniemi’s critique is defeated when international law is viewed 
not from the vantage point of a deductive legal order but instead as an 
inductive form of reason.  From at least Aristotle onwards, philosophers 
and lawyers have commented on the inductive nature of legal argument in 
general.315  The common law, being principally derived from legal 
argument, places a systemic premium on the inductive nature of law 
itself.316  Both classic common law theorists and legal realists have 
defended the virtue of the inductive process over deductive legal 
reasoning.317 
Viewed from the perspective of inductive reasoning, there is nothing 
strange about the aporia highlighted by Koskenniemi: inductive argument 
relies upon, and formulates rules from, the observation of relevant facts.318  
To borrow from the philosophy of science, it is similarly a truism that any 
observation of facts to form a theory depends on the existence of a higher-
order paradigm to which the facts are relevant.319  Scientific discourse, and 
 
312 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 66. 
313 See, e.g., CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 68–69 (5th ed. 2006). 
314 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
315 See, e.g., Miles F. Burnyeat, Enthymene: Aristotle on the Rationality of Rhetoric, in ESSAYS ON 
ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC (Amelie Rorty ed., 1996). 
316 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
317 See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing Cases, 42 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 813, 825–29 (2002) (providing an overview of the history of theoretical 
rejection of deductive logic as ordering principle in U.S. common law in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries). 
318 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
319 See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 81, 96–105 (2012). 
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other inductive discourse, similarly functions by an oscillating movement 
between facts and norms, each of which depending on the other for its 
ultimate support.320 
The fundamental distinction between the world in which 
Koskenniemi’s aporia turns into a paradox and one in which it is a simple 
description of the modality of rule formation is a question of how norms 
are recognized.  In a deductive system, it is assumed that the ultimate 
paradigm is closed.  Recognition depends on the placement of a rule within 
a full interpretation or rationalization of the larger paradigm.321  Both the 
philosophy of language and the philosophy of science challenge this view 
of paradigm coherence on the basis of the insights garnered by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein.322  Kuhn, in his seminal work on scientific revolutions, 
summarizes this debate: 
 
That question is very old and has generally been answered by 
saying that we must know, consciously or intuitively, what a 
chair, or leaf, or game is.  We must, that is, grasp some set of 
attributes that all games and that only games have in common.  
Wittgenstein, however, concluded that, given the way we use 
language and the sort of world to which we apply it, there need 
be no such characteristics.  Though a discussion of some of the 
attributes shared by a number of games and chairs or leaves often 
held us learn how to employ the corresponding term, there is no 
set of characteristics that is simultaneously applicable to all 
members of the class and to them alone.  Instead, confronted with 
a previously unobserved activity, we apply the term “game” 
because what we are seeing bears a close “family resemblance” 
to a number of the activities that we have previously learned to 
call by that name.  For Wittgenstein, in short, games, and chairs, 
and leaves are natural families, each constituted by a network of 
overlapping and crisscross of resemblances.  The existence of 
such a network sufficiently accounts for our success in 
identifying the corresponding object or activity.323 
 
International law, conceived of as an inductive process, precisely 
follows this insight.  Family resemblance is both ascending, i.e., premised 
upon prior observation, and descending, i.e., applying a norm to make a 
new observation fit within the language of the discipline.324  Obviously, 
 
320 Id. 
321 Id. at 108. 
322 See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (P.M.S. Hacker & 
Joachim Schulte eds., 4th ed. 2009). 
323 See KUHN, supra note 319, at 108–09. 
324 See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 322. 
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this process too must oscillate between observation and norm-application 
for either the observation or the norm to make sense.325  Rather than being 
mutually exclusive of each other, the ascending and descending patterns of 
argument are mutually supportive, and as such support the open texture, or 
in Koskenniemi’s terms, “openness” of legal language.326 
This inductive openness or open texture of international law departs 
from the single dimension imagined by Koskenniemi by introducing a new, 
integrative dimension.  This integrative dimension transforms phenomena 
that, by themselves, are of no significance to facts to be accounted for in 
legal argument.  This integrative move stabilizes oscillation from falling 
into nonsense and makes it possible to speak of different legal arguments 
and choose between them by finding, on the basis of conduct, which family 
resemblance invoked by the parties in fact fits most closely the problem at 
hand. 
Koskenniemi unsuccessfully seeks to defend his aporia against what 
he calls the “law as fact” approach.327  His main objection to such an 
approach is that “it ignores the determining power of the law as a 
conceptual scheme which controls our perception of the facts of 
international society.”328  This rejoinder misses the point because it 
assumes that the conceptual scheme provided is deductive rather than 
inductive, that it provides a paradigm that permits a seamless placement of 
a rule by means of a full interpretation or rationalization of the larger 
paradigm itself.329  The common law approach rejects such a view and 
relies precisely on the interaction of fact and the conceptual framework to 
which it is relevant to form an inductively coherent, pragmatic, and organic 
system.330 
 
4.  Resolving the Problems of the Prevalent Approaches 
 
The common law approach can resolve the problems of the prevalent 
approaches discussed above.  The inductive nature of the common law 
approach does not need to overstate the internal uniformity or the 
convergence of the IIA regime in order to make prior decisions of arbitral 
tribunals under different treaty instruments relevant to interpretation.  It 
also does not need to elevate arbitral decisions to formal sources of 
international law.  Rather, it allows an understanding of the modality and 
value of both convergence and divergence. 
 
 
325 See id. 
326 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 61. 
327 See id. at 522–32. 
328 See id. at 524. 
329 See KUHN, supra note 319, at 108. 
330 See supra notes 275–280. 
SOURGENS_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:37 PM 
 Law’s Laboratory 
   34:181 (2014) 
 
235 
a.  Problems of the Custom and Regime Approaches 
 
Both the customary international law and regime approaches 
recognized that the decisions of IIA arbitral tribunals are highly influential 
for the resolution of future IIA disputes.331  This insight posited the 
formation of a new body of law out of the growth of IIAs themselves and 
the decisions that interpreted them.332  The problems faced by both 
approaches, although to different degrees, were twofold.  First, they 
overstated the coherence of IIAs and IIA awards in order to create a 
sufficiently cohesive system that would justify future reliance on past IIA 
awards.333  Second, they overstated the independence of IIA decisions from 
other areas of law and thereby created a closed system that did not 
resemble the open texture of the body of IIA decisions.334 
The common law approach fully credits the insight that IIA decisions 
are highly influential in future IIA disputes.335  It acknowledges the central 
importance of IIA decisions to the international legal enterprise.336  It 
places these decisions at the forefront of the interpretive exercise engaged 
in by international tribunals both by selecting the specific factual question 
an interpretation has to answer and by identifying the relevant rules of law 
to take into account in the process of interpretation.337 
But the common law approach does so without overstating the 
coherence of IIAs or IIA awards critical to the customary international 
theory and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the regime theory.  The common 
law approach concerns itself with the horizontal coherence between 
decisions (i.e., the understanding of the scope of legally relevant facts to 
take into account in an interpretation).338  It does not principally draw on 
the vertical cohesion between decisions or the IIAs on which they rely (i.e., 
the common legal rule that all of the decisions interpret, whether in a 
moderately different form).339  This change in focus permits the common 
law approach to abandon the requirement of a single legal rule or principle 
that all the decisions interpret in common.  It can treat each IIA as a 
distinctly different international legal bargain (and consequently each IIA 
decision as interpreting a different bargain) without giving up the key 
relevance of these decisions for setting the interpretive horizon for future 
IIA disputes. 
 
331 See discussion supra Parts II.A–B. 
332 See discussion supra Parts II.A–B. 
333 See discussion supra Parts II.A–B. 
334 See discussion supra Parts II.A–C. 
335 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
336 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
337 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
338 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
339 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
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But the common law approach also does not submit that every IIA is a 
fundamentally different bargain in all respects.  Rather, it is a method that 
permits discovery of relevant differences in drafting between IIAs in light 
of specific factual problems at bar during IIA disputes.340  The common 
law approach is consistent with the hypothesis of a core overlap between 
many IIAs regarding their historical development to be tested in every 
case.341  The point is that the common law approach can make relevant to 
the analysis of an IIA at bar decisions of a tribunal interpreting a 
completely different treaty instrument, such as another IIA or even the 
GATT or European Convention on Human Rights, by making relevant the 
facts of that dispute as a point of comparison.342  This was a problem that 
either the regime theory or the customary international law theory could 
overcome. 
The common law approach also does not need to divorce the body of 
IIA awards from general international law to the degree that regime theory 
must do.  In order to be a self-contained regime, an area of law must exhibit 
significant separation from general international law with respect to both 
primary and secondary rules of liability.343  IIA decisions rely upon the 
secondary rules of general international law.344  IIA decisions interpret the 
primary rules contained in IIAs by reference to decisions such as general 
international law decisions, WTO decisions, and human rights decisions.345  
This significantly hampered the plausibility of the regime theory as a 
descriptive matter.346 
The common law approach encourages parties to draw on a broad set 
of international legal decisions to set the scope of legally relevant facts that 
must be taken into account in interpreting an IIA.  It rejects any 
interposition of a strong paradigm of “international investment law” 
because it takes seriously the open texture of investor-state decisions to 
date.347  In doing so, it can explain how IIA decisions are relevant—and in 
many instances more relevant—than general international law decisions.  
The factual problems will have a higher likelihood of overlap given the 
similarity of problems (investor rights) and actors (e.g., investors, host 
states, and host state agencies).348  That does not mean, however, that only 
those actors are relevant.  To the contrary, analogy to problems 
 
340 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
341 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
342 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
343 See discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
344 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
345 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
346 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
347 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
348 See Frédéric G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith: Investment Protection Following the Denunciation of 
International Investment Agreements, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 335 (2013). 
SOURGENS_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:37 PM 
 Law’s Laboratory 
   34:181 (2014) 
 
237 
encountered in other areas is highly persuasive and at times dispositive in 
IIA disputes to the point of informing a common understanding of the key 
problem of fair and equitable treatment across IIAs (if not always 
informing its common solution).349 
In sum, the common law approach can better account for the original 
impetus of both the regime theory and the customary international law 
theory: IIA awards are highly persuasive in future disputes even though 
these disputes have no common party.  It provides a better description than 
either theory because it allows for a greater divergence between IIAs and 
IIA awards, and a greater amount of reliance on non-IIA sources.  The open 
texture it achieves is also normatively preferable precisely because it does 
not risk breaking apart international law into fully autonomous fiefdoms of 
an ever more rarified group of experts. 
 
b.  The Lex Specialis Problem 
 
Authors calling into question the systemic legitimacy of investor-state 
arbitration identified two central problems of prevalent approaches to 
international investment law.  First, they identified normative 
overstatements on the part of proponents of the customary international law 
and regime theorists of investor-state arbitration.350  Second, they submitted 
that current international legal approaches dealt poorly with the emergence 
of international investors as independent right holders (or, at the very least, 
claimants) on the international legal stage.351  Although it is likely that 
critics would reiterate their complaints with respect to the common law 
approach, this approach in fact takes into account both key insights. 
Thus, critics of the legitimacy of international investment law will 
submit that treating arbitral awards as part of a common law exacerbates 
(rather than resolves) the problem they have identified.  They will submit 
that a common law system precisely relies upon the status of case law as a 
formal source of law (i.e., a source “imparting to a given rule the force of 
law”).352  Judicial and arbitral decision precisely lack such force under 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which lists the 
commonly agreed upon sources of international law.353  Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice at most admits to the use of 
judicial and arbitral decisions as material sources of law, and then only 
insofar as they point out the normative content of formal sources of 
 
349 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
350 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
351 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
352 See, e.g., GODEFRIDUS J. H. HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 
(1983) (summarizing the debate on the difference between formal and material sources of international 
law). 
353 ICJ Statute, supra note 25, art. 38. 
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This criticism is misplaced.  As discussed more fully below, in a 
common law system, decisions have binding force only within a hierarchy 
of courts.354  There is no hierarchy of international courts or tribunals in 
international law.355  The decisions of international courts and tribunals are 
not binding authority; they are persuasive.356  The common law approach 
thus does not submit, as this criticism supposes, that the decisions of 
international courts and tribunals are formal sources of international law. 
The original criticism is in fact resolved by the common law approach.  
Functionally, the common law approach uses prior decisions of 
international courts and tribunals in the manner critics would submit they 
should be used: the decisions aid in the interpretation of the relevant formal 
source of international law.357  Cases frame the issue in the case at bar by 
identifying the legally relevant facts for which the interpretation of the 
legal instrument has to account.358  They identify the relevant audience to 
determine the ordinary meaning of a treaty provision.359  They point out the 
relevant areas of international law in resolving the dispute.360  They provide 
concrete points of comparison of possible interpretations of similar 
language in similar factual contexts.361  In all these regards, the decisions 
do not independently have force of law but have value only to the extent 
they illuminate the content of the applicable rules of international law.362  It 
was this independent force of law to which critics appeared to be most 
vehemently—and correctly—opposed. 
The related criticism that the use of international decisions is 
illegitimate because states have not consented to its use can similarly be 
resolved.363  Even accepting the premise that international law is binding on 
a state only to the extent it has specifically consented, state parties to 
international arbitral proceedings use cases in the same manner as 
claimants.364  They use cases to identify relevant conduct that an 
interpretation of the key legal instruments has to take into account.365  They 
submit cases reaching favorable interpretations in cases they submit to be 
factually similar.366  They distinguish cases on the facts submitted by 
 
354 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
355 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
356 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
357 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
358 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
359 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
360 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
361 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
362 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
363 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
364 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
365 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
366 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
SOURGENS_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:37 PM 
 Law’s Laboratory 
   34:181 (2014) 
 
239 
opposing counsel.  It is this technique, not the substance of each particular 
decision, which makes up the common law approach.  State conduct in 
every arbitral proceeding in which the state has legal counsel amply 
supports this technique. 
The common law approach similarly takes seriously that investor-state 
arbitration is the bellwether of introducing public international law into a 
world beyond state-to-state behavior.  Investor-state arbitration gives non-
state actors immediate rights of action for significant damages against 
states premised upon international law.367  As critics point out, this 
situation leads to different problems for international law to answer than in 
the context of state-to-state disputes because in the state-to-state context, 
international obligations are typically reciprocal, whereas in the investor-
state context, international obligations are principally unilateral, binding 
the host state rather than the foreign investor. 
The common law approach precisely answers this concern by placing 
the similarity of facts in the current disputes to facts in prior adjudications 
at the heart of its method.  It seeks to develop how the factual predicates of 
a specific dispute affect immediate investor rights (as opposed to the rights 
of the home state acting in diplomatic protection).  In doing so, it uses facts 
relied upon by host states in defense of disputed measures to determine the 
appropriate interpretation of the legal instruments invoked by the investor.  
It further allows host states to develop factual predicates of investor 
liability in regularly litigated counterclaims by host states against foreign 
investors.  The open texture of the common law approach thus permits the 
critics to bring their concerns forward within the context of the law as it 
currently exists rather than having to counsel abandoning the enterprise 
entirely. 
 
B.  Prior Decisions as Persuasive Precedent 
 
So far, the focus has been upon the systemic functions of the common 
law approach: how does the common law approach change our 
appreciation of the role of international law in the resolution of investor-
state disputes as a whole?  What remains to be developed is the particular 
manner in which prior decisions are used in each case.  This section 
develops such a theory of persuasive precedent. 
A misconception about the common law approach, as applied to 
international law, is that the common law approach must import rules of 
stare decisis.368  Because authors reject that these rules can be imported in 
every case, they opt for a civil law-inspired system of “jurisprudence 
 
367 See Sourgens, supra note 348. 
368 See, e.g., DUGAN, supra note 285, at 217; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 285, at 35–37; Gal-
Or, supra note 285, at 48 (noting as paradoxical that international law developed on the basis of 
precedent while formally rejecting stare decisis). 
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constante”⎯binding precedent once a critical mass of decisions have 
resolved an issue of law in the same manner.369  Viewed through the lens of 
the common law approach, this misconception can be corrected,370 thereby 
materially altering the legitimacy debate⎯whether inconsistent outcomes 
are a danger to international law.371 
 
1.  The Stare Decisis Fallacy 
 
Rejecting the common law approach because it would import the rules 
of stare decisis is a structural and a substantive fallacy.  In resolving these 
fallacies, it is possible to arrive at an understanding of persuasive precedent 
that better reflects the current state of international law. 
The structural fallacy, mentioned above, translates the stare decisis 
rules, which operate only within a hierarchy of courts, to a dispute 
resolution system that is non-hierarchical.  In the most scrutinized sense, 
stare decisis requires the highest court in a jurisdiction to follow its own 
precedent.372  And in terms of binding precedent, stare decisis requires 
lower courts to follow apposite case law from higher courts within the 
same jurisdiction.373  Lower courts may also have to follow apposite case 
law issued by other panels within the same court.374 
The structure of international law dispute resolution does not meet any 
of the prerequisites of stare decisis or binding precedent.  There is no 
hierarchy of international courts and tribunals375⎯they operate alongside, 
 
369 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 377; cf. Bjorklund, Emerging Civilization, supra note 170, 
at 1295 (“The better analogy, and the approach towards which investment arbitration is headed, is to the 
jurisprudence constante of the French civil law tradition.  Such an analogy is appealing for several 
reasons.  First, it recognizes that the starting point for analysis should be the language of the 
treaty⎯just as the starting point should be the code in a municipal civil law system.  Secondarily, but 
not insignificantly, tribunals would then turn to the decisions of other tribunals interpreting the same or 
similar treaty language.  These decisions could be viewed as persuasive to the extent they were well 
reasoned.  Moreover, doctrine would develop through the accretion of awards decided in a consistent 
manner⎯the ‘method of small paces.’”). 
370 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
371 See discussion infra IV.B.2. 
372 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992); Jeremy Waldron, Stare 
Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
373 See, e.g., Algero, supra note 256, at 783–86 (summarizing the historical development of stare 
decisis in English and American common law).  For a discussion of stare decisis at the federal circuit 
court and district court level, see generally Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the 
United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787 (2012) (examining the law of the circuit practice of U.S. federal circuit 
courts through which future three-judge panels are bound by published decisions of three-judge panels 
from the circuit in question and noting the problems resulting from a lack of a similar doctrine at the 
district court level). 
374 See Mead, supra note 373. 
375 See, e.g., Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1002; Rao, supra note 35, at 936; 
Stephan, supra note 6, at 1591–92. 
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and in competition with, each other.376  Furthermore, in the context of 
adjudicating investor-state disputes, tribunals are fully independent of each 
other and do not function as different panels of the same court.377  Even 
under a more regimented system of investor-state arbitration, decisions 
interpreting the same IIA could create different kinds of stare decisis.378  
Even if such a system existed, its severe limitations are apparent when 
considering the diversity of respondent states in investor-state 
arbitrations.379 
Similarly, it is a substantive fallacy to suggest that a critical mass of 
decisions reaching the same result requires reproducing their results 
because “stare decisis . . . applie[s] not to a single decision, but to a line of 
cases, or a jurisprudence constante.”380  This line of reasoning overreaches 
and under-explains current practices in investor-state arbitrations.381  
Specifically, jurisprudence constante exaggerates the weight of precedence 
because tribunals frequently rule against settled case law.382  For instance, 
the Glamis decision concerning the scope of NAFTA’s fair and equitable 
treatment standard significantly departs from what proponents of 
jurisprudence constante consider settled case law.383  Tribunals also 
frequently rely upon a single case decision without considering whether 
that decision is broadly accepted.384 
The common law treatment of precedent better reflects current 
practices in investor-state arbitration because even a single decision by an 
out-of-state court can be highly persuasive, and perhaps even binding, if it 
 
376 See, e.g., Cogan, supra note 6, at 438–46; Stephan, supra note 6, at 1606–17. 
377 See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, art. 53, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160. 
378 See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 5, 2005, 
T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101, Annex E (limiting appellate mechanism to disputes arising under the bilateral 
treaty). 
379 See ICSID, supra note 87.  
380 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 376. 
381 Id. at 377. 
382 See id. at 372–73. 
383 For a discussion of Glamis, see supra Part III.B.2. 
384 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 123–128 (May 11, 2005) 
(relying upon two recent arbitral decisions that had not been consistently endorsed); see also Perenco 
Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador & Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/6, Provisional Measures, ¶¶ 50, 55 (May 8, 2009) (relying on a decision issued only 
months earlier).  Given the pattern of investor-state arbitrations, a rigid application of the jurisprudence 
constante would result in procedural unfairness.  For instance, several decisions on windfall taxation 
have been issued in a three-year span.  In this timeframe, claims regarding similar measures were 
already pending.  Using a jurisprudence constante approach, these claims would have been mooted by 
third-party proceedings that the remaining claimants did not participate in and on the basis of 
fundamentally different records. Thus, a jurisprudence constante approach runs the risk of seriously 
conflicting with due process rights. 
SOURGENS_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:37 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business                            34:181 (2014) 
 
242 
is convincing.385  A decision’s persuasiveness is determined by the 
precision with which it analyzes a problem that is relevant to a subsequent 
case.386  A decision is particularly persuasive when it addresses the same 
problem or rejects a principal argument in the current case.387  A decision 
can also be highly persuasive if it makes a question in the current case less 
vague or ambiguous.388  And adopting such a decision would further the 
development of a newly expanded paradigm.389 
Alternatively, a decision’s persuasiveness may depend on its weight, 
otherwise known as “[its] ability . . . to prevail against a prescription 
indicating the opposite result.”390  The measure of the “ability of a 
prescription to prevail” is the frequency with which it bests other rival 
prescriptions.391  Weight replicates the concern of the jurisprudence 
constante that a string of decisions in which a prescription prevailed ought 
to be given deference.392  In the common law approach, weight is one factor 
of persuasion rather than the exclusive one.393  Further, as evidenced by the 
continued existence of minority rules in U.S. common law, weight alone 
does not guarantee convergence without the presence of additional 
elements.394 
Persuasiveness more generally also can be aphoristic or canonical.395  
Although canonical statements are typically considered to be binding in the 
formal sense, the anthologizing of decisional law that is not formally 
 
385 See Richard Bronaugh, Persuasive Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 223 (Laurence Goldstein 
ed., 1987) (“Any serious consideration of a persuasive precedent in an opinion (i.e. not ignoring it or 
merely mentioning it as of minor relevance) can have only one of two purposes, the writer either has 
been convinced by it or is distinguishing it (which renders its convincingness of no account).”). 
386 See Schauer, Prescriptions, supra note 274, at 913 (“For present purposes, therefore, the 
important dimension is not a dimension in which the opposite of particularity is generality, but rather 
one in which particularity is best seen as specificity or precision, and its opposite as vagueness.”). 
387 See Chad W. Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 67 
(2009). 
388 See Schauer, Prescriptions, supra note 274, at 913. 
389 See KUHN, supra note 319, at 96–105; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO, A STUDY IN 
REPUTATION (1990) (stating that Benjamin Cardozo was a master of persuasion through his precise 
casting of problems). 
390  Schauer, Prescriptions, supra note 274, at 919. 
391 See id. 
392 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19. 
393 See Schauer, Prescriptions, supra note 274, at 919. 
394 See id. 
395 Id. at 916 (“A canonical prescription . . . is one that appears in specific written form as a 
prescription and for which there is a common source and a common point of reference. . . . And so too 
is a prescription set forth at one time and in one place by a court, at least where it is expected that this is 
the form of the prescription that is the starting point for lower courts and others who are bound by it.  
The three-part test for obscenity in Miller v. California is canonical in much the same way that statutory 
provisions are canonical and so is the actual malice rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the form 
of the warning in Miranda v. Arizona.”). 
SOURGENS_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/14 7:37 PM 
 Law’s Laboratory 
   34:181 (2014) 
 
243 
binding, for example in textbooks, can also be described as canonical.396  
The decisions included in the canon share an aphoristic quality, as the 
expression of the third-party beneficiary rule in Lawrence v. Fox 
illustrates.397  In other instances, the poignancy of their specific facts turns 
the affirmation of a rule of law into a symbolic or emblematic totem for the 
rule, as could be argued is the case in Hamer v. Sidway.398  Adopting these 
decisions strengthens the expression of the paradigm. 
This common law process of persuasion better describes how arbitral 
tribunals treat prior decisions.  As an international law scholar noted about 
the relationship between the various decisions of international courts and 
tribunals: 
 
By contrast to the binding nature of the judgments of superior 
courts, it belongs to the logic of networks that autonomous 
regimes enter into relations of mutual observation.  Legal 
certainty within this polycentric legal system cannot be furnished 
by a hierarchically superior decisional instance placed at the 
center of the law.  Rather, what can be realistically expected is 
uncertainty absorption in a process of iterative connection of 
legal decision to legal decision that recalls the strict precedent 
tradition, but that also departs from it in various significant 
ways.399 
 
The common law approach takes this nature of international law into 
account without giving up a manner in which the persuasive force of cross-
fertilization can be explained and harnessed.  By treating the persuasive 
precedent along the axes of precision, weight, and canonicity, it is possible 
to account for why decisions frequently are uniform on similar questions of 
law without becoming static or guaranteeing complete convergence.  By 
giving these factors persuasive force rather than using them to explain 
binding force, they further fit within the broader inductive framework of 
the common law described in the previous section.  Weight and canonicity 
are the conservative forces anchoring legal analysis in past 
conceptualizations of the law.  Precision on the other hand permits a 
reshaping of both weight and canonicity by forcing decision to include 
facts, which make relevant a different resolution to the problem than the 
weight of prior decisions would facially suggest. 
 
 
396 Id.; see also Farnsworth, supra note 269. 
397 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); see also supra note 279. 
398 Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891); see also Farnsworth, supra note 269, at 1442–43. 
399 Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1039–40. 
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2.  Legitimacy Restored: The Virtue of Divergence 
 
The common law approach makes strides in resolving the legitimacy 
challenge of international law resolution of disputes between investors and 
their host states.400  Rather than considering divergence an evil to be 
avoided, it is one of the happy incidents of the lack of hierarchy between 
tribunals underlying the common law approach that a single courageous 
tribunal may, if the parties choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel legal 
approaches to social and economic problems in international law without 
risking the rest of the body of international law.401  Further, the decisions 
reached by any tribunal follow the input of the parties in framing and 
presenting their case to the tribunal rather than the proclivities of the 
arbitrators.402  The common law approach thus develops a view of 
international law that is open textured, grounded in party consent, and 
ultimately responsive to the justice of the proposed problem’s solutions in 
jurisprudence.403 
By virtue of the multiplicity of international courts and tribunals, the 
lack of a hierarchy of tribunals will, perforce, lead to divergence.404  
Similar divergence is amply on display in the disagreement on common 
law rules between U.S. states.405  It is evident in circuit splits on questions 
of federal law not dispositively resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.406  
This divergence does not, by and large, undermine the legitimacy of state 
common law or U.S. federal law.  It similarly should not lead to any 
conclusions about the legitimacy of international law or adjudication. 
Apart from this straightforward observation, the common law supports 
 
400 See discussion supra Part II. 
401 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
402 See discussion supra Part III. 
403 Cf. discussion supra Part IV.A. 
404 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
405 The development of promissory estoppel in the United States may be one such example.  See, 
e.g., Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Promissory Estoppel: Growth in the Face of Doctrinal Resistance, 
72 TENN. L. REV. 1111 (2005).  A controversy whether promissory estoppel is a reliance or a 
promissory theory of liability continues to rage on.  Compare Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The 
Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991) (arguing that promissory estoppel rests upon 
promissory liability, not reliance liability), with Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” 
on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998) (arguing 
that promissory estoppel rests upon reliance); see also Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of 
Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 669 (2010) (judges typically combine both approaches in a hybrid understanding of promissory 
estoppel). 
406 See generally Emily Grant, Scott A. Hendrickson & Michael S. Lynch, The Ideological Divide: 
Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decision, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559 (2012) (discussing the 
limited circumstances when circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
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not only that divergence is to be expected, but also that it is to be desired.  
A key to the persuasiveness of international legal decisions is their 
increased precision with which to understand the problem presented for 
resolution.407  The recent turn to adjudication in international law has 
revealed the relative, and frequently purposeful, vagueness of international 
law.408  To formulate precise norms of international law, different 
problematizations of common fact patterns reflect, not the illegitimacy of 
the dispute resolution process, but the original vagueness of the law being 
applied. 
It is through the mediation of different problematizations of common 
fact patterns that international law itself can contrast problem solutions.  It 
is this divergence that permits the weight of a problem solution to be tested 
at all.  It is this divergence that permits an appraisal of the relative precision 
with which actual problems can be answered by international legal 
analysis.409  It is this laboratory that permits, eventually, the authoring of 
canonical problem solutions.410  Disagreement between tribunals, therefore, 
is a sign of healthy development and serves the ultimate development of 
the law towards better, more precise norms in the future.411 
The experimental nature of adjudication is evidence of legitimacy of 
international dispute resolution in yet another manner.  Authors have 
submitted that international adjudication is running away from state 
consent and creating an illegitimate law because the judicial and arbitral 
outcomes do not reflect the will of its subjects.  Divergence in international 
dispute resolution tends to disprove this submission.412  Divergence reveals 
the responsiveness of international dispute resolution to the process of 
pleading and presenting the case by the parties.413  This responsiveness 
means that the law develops only because of the will, and with the 
“consent,” of disputing parties to the outcome of international dispute 
resolution, if only because the losing party was unable to persuade the 
tribunal of a “better” outcome, i.e., a more precise, weightier, or more 
paradigmatic solution to the litigation. 
Not enough, a party considering the result reached in prior decisions 
unjust is not precluded by the common law approach to relitigate its case in 
future disputes.  The status quo ante is only law so long as it is persuasive.  
A truly unjust result will in short order not only come to be socially 
incongruent, but also come to lack consistency with the growing body of 
 
407 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
408 See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 66 n.163 (2003). 
409 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
410 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
411 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
412 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
413 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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the law around it.414  And change.415 
 
V.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
This Article began by taking stock of the academic responses to the 
proliferation of international dispute resolution of investor-state disputes 
that failed.  It uncovered that common to all these theories was the 
superimposition of a substantive organizing principle over the wealth of 
jurisprudence (strong property protection, strong regulatory sovereignty, a 
grand bargain of protection for development promotion).  These 
substantive principles failed to reflect both treaty and arbitral practice. 
The Article proceeded to explain that the problem of academic 
theorizing about investor-state arbitration was their search for a substantive 
organizing principle in the first place.  It explained that no such substantive 
principle is likely to emerge.  The proliferation of international law and 
adjudication introduced a heterogeneity that could no longer be overcome 
by further abstraction or deduction. 
The Article proposed that the appropriate solution for international 
law scholarship was not to search for the elusive first principle—an 
exercise as fruitful as Waiting for Godot—but rather to treat international 
law as process.  Viewed in this manner, it became apparent that 
international adjudication behaves like the common law, inductively and 
pragmatically.  Precedent became the conceptual language through which 
to understand new disputes and the limits of international legal problem 
solution.  But the inductive nature of the legal process explained why this 
language of international law resembled more the new lingua franca of 
international law, English, rather than its Latin predecessor.  It continues to 
expand by creating new family resemblances between new problems and 
old solutions.  These new resemblances enrich its conceptual grammar and 
vocabulary.  Just like English, and unlike Latin, this conceptual language 
continues to adapt to new technology, political sea change, and shifts in 
culture. 
The value of this conception of international law likely extends 
beyond the scope of investor-state arbitration, or even international 
adjudication.  It possibly identifies something about the nature of 
international law in its own right.  As noted by a practicing lawyer in the 




414 EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 74. 
415 Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration 
and International Law, 5 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2006) (noting the beneficial competition for 
future acceptance between investor-state awards). 
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The task of finding ways to work out international disputes tends 
also to develop in the Office attorney what might be called a 
pragmatic or functional approach to international law—a 
tendency to view that law less as a body of fixed and 
unchangeable rules than as a flexible tool for use in forging real 
solutions to practical problems of international order.  Perhaps as 
an outgrowth of common-law training, there is a working habit of 
viewing new and unique areas of problems on a case-by-case 
basis at first, and letting the law work itself out, rather than 
jumping immediately into the enunciation of broad principles.  In 
general, precedent and authority, while important, do not 
preclude analysis in terms of sensible result and workable rule.416 
 
Perhaps the common law view can encourage internationalists to see 
international law not as a body of rules organized under principles and 
axioms, but to focus their attention again on tackling and resolving 
problems.  On its best of days, international law has lived up to these 
aspirations and been a tool for change rather than an impediment to it.  To 
do so again, it is necessary to shed the constraints of internationalist 
formalism evident in the deductive views of international law and embrace 
a different, functionalist idea of law.  As economic, social, environmental, 
and resource problems tend to become increasingly global and increasingly 
defy easy categorization in the musty terms of 19th century neo-classical 
aphorisms, this change would not come a moment too soon. 
 
416 Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Advisor: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign 
Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT’L L. 633, 680 (1962).  For further discussion of Bilder’s remarks, see David 
Kennedy, Speaking Law to Power: International Law and Foreign Policy Closing Remarks, 23 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 173 (2005). 
